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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the Review
is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly affected earlier
interpretations of North Dakota law, and other potential cases of interest.
The following topics are included in the Review:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—WORKERS COMPENSATION—
OFFSETS WITH OTHER BENEFITS ...................................... 568
CIVIL PROCEDURE—MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL—
ARTICULATING THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD .... 576
CIVIL PROCEDURE—PRETRIAL JUDGMENTS—
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS .......................................................... 579
CONTRACT LAW—CONTRACT INTERPRETATION—
FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS ................................................... 582
CRIMINAL LAW—ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE & LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES ............................................................ 589
CRIMINAL LAW—MOTOR VEHICLES—SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS .......................................................................... 592
CRIMINAL LAW—NIGHTTIME WARRANTS—
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL........................ 596
CRIMINAL LAW—PROCEDURE—USE OF RESTRAINTS
ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS ............................................... 601
CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—DETERMINING
THE EXTENT OF FORCE REQUIRED................................... 606
CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF AN ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE ......... 612
CRIMINAL LAW—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION—DEFINING “INVOLVED”
DISTRIBUTION .......................................................................... 616
EVIDENCE—EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY—CHILD
VICTIM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT............................................. 619
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD SUPPORT—COMPUTATION OF
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS........................................................ 625
PROBATE LAW AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION—
NOTICE TO CREDITORS—REASONABLE DILIGENCE
STANDARD ................................................................................ 628
TORT LAW—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—SHOWING
GOOD CAUSE ............................................................................ 632

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—WORKERS COMPENSATION—OFFSETS
WITH OTHER BENEFITS
TEDFORD V. WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE
Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed an amended district
court judgment.1 The district court judgment reversed “WSI’s decision to
offset Richard Tedford’s federal social security retirement benefits against
his worker’s compensation disability benefits.”2 The judgment also affirmed an order that awarded Tedford both attorney fees and costs pursuant to
Section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code.3 On appeal, Tedford
sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 28-32-50.4 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in holding that
WSI erred in its decision to offset Tedford’s social security benefits against
his workers compensation benefits.5 However, the court reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Tedford, instead finding that
the district court erred in its determination that WSI had acted without substantial justification.6 Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied
Tedford’s motion on appeal seeking attorney fees and costs.7
In 1985, Tedford applied for workers compensation benefits after
injuring his back.8 WSI accepted Tedford’s claim awarding him both medical expenses and disability benefits.9 Since April of 1989, Tedford received

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Tedford v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2007 ND 142, ¶ 1, 738 N.W.2d 29, 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
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temporary total disability benefits.10 In June of 1990, WSI began paying
Tedford permanent total disability benefits upon a determination that
Tedford was permanently and totally disabled.11 In 1989, “Tedford also
began receiving federal social security disability benefits” (SSDI).12 As
required under Section 65-05-09.1, the amount of Tedford’s SSDI benefits
was offset against the temporary total disability benefits he received.13
Upon the change in classification of his disability status from temporary to permanent in June of 1990, WSI continued to offset his SSDI
benefits.14 Then, when Tedford reached his retirement age of 65 years and
2 months, his SSDI benefits were converted to social security retirement
benefits automatically.15 Following this conversion, WSI sought to offset
Tedford’s retirement benefits against his permanent total disability benefits
by issuing an order.16 Tedford requested that WSI’s order be reconsidered
upon which an administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that WSI’s
order to offset retirement benefits be reversed.17 WSI rejected the ALJ’s
recommendation and issued an order requiring that “Tedford’s social security retirement benefits be offset against his permanent total disability
benefits.”18
Tedford appealed WSI’s decision to the district court.19 Initially, the
district court found that WSI’s decision to offset the benefits was not an
error and affirmed the order.20 Tedford made a motion to amend the judgment, which was heard by a different judge.21 The second judge reversed
WSI’s order finding that WSI was not allowed to offset Tedford’s benefits
and instead directed that as of August 1, 2003, Tedford was to receive his
full total disability benefits.22 Tedford also sought attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code.23 Upon
determining that WSI’s legal arguments were not substantially justified,
Tedford was awarded both attorney fees and costs.24
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
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In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it reviews
an administrative agency decision in the same manner that district courts
review them pursuant to Section 28-32-46.25 On appeal, the case only presents questions of law, not of fact, therefore Sections 28-32-46 and 28-3249 provide that unless the agency order is not in accordance with law, the
court must affirm the order.26
On appeal, WSI argues that its decision to offset Tedford’s social
security benefits against his disability benefits through workers compensation was not an error.27 The parties did not dispute that Tedford was determined to be totally disabled in April of 1989, at which time WSI had the
authority to offset his SSDI benefits against his workers compensation
disability benefits.28 WSI did not have the authority to offset Tedford’s
social security retirement benefits against his disability benefits at that time,
however.29
In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature authorized the offsetting of the
social security retirement benefits of injured employees against the employees permanent total disability benefits through its enactment of Section 6505-09.2.30 This statute specifically provided that it was effective for
workers that retired on or after July 1, 1989.31 Following this enactment, in
Kallhoff v. North Dakota Worker’s Compensation Bureau,32 the North
Dakota Supreme Court considered whether the offset statute applied to an
employee whose federal SSDI benefits were converted to retirement benefits after July 1, 1989, but who had been found totally disabled and began
receiving benefits before July 1, 1989.33 In Kallhoff, the court held that
WSI was not allowed to offset Kallhoff’s retirement benefits against his
workers compensation disability benefits under Section 65-05-09.2.34 The
court determined that workers receiving total disability benefits anticipated
and relied on their receipt of unreduced benefits.35 The court further noted
that legislative history indicates that the legislature did not want to impact
the expectation of these workers.36 Instead, the court noted that the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. ¶ 7, 738 N.W.2d at 32.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.2 (1989)).
484 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1992).
Tedford, ¶ 11, 738 N.W.2d at 32.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. (citing Kallhoff, 484 N.W.2d at 514).
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legislature was concerned with the protection of the workers’ reliance
interest because it did not provide that it expressly intended to adversely
affect disabled workers of the type at issue.37 Therefore, the court held that
Section 65-05-09.2 only applied to workers that were qualified to receive
workers compensation disability benefits and who turned sixty-five on or
after July 1, 1989.38
In 1993, the legislature amended Section 65-05-09.2 to provide for the
“offset of social security retirement benefits against the benefits of certain
totally disabled claimants.”39 However, the legislature also provided that
claimants receiving benefits that were offset by SSDI benefits would continue to receive at least the same aggregate amount of benefits.40 Additionally, in 1995, the legislature enacted Section 65-05-09.3(2) and created a
presumption that disabled employees eligible for social security retirement
benefits were found to be retired and ineligible for workers compensation
disability benefits.41
In Gregory v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau,42 the North
Dakota Supreme Court considered applying this presumption in the case of
an employee who was totally disabled prior to the statute’s enactment.43
The court affirmed the district court judgment which had reversed an order
by WSI that discontinued Gregory’s disability benefits and ordered a reinstatement of the benefits.44 The court relied on Kallhoff in its analysis of
whether WSI had a valid obligation to pay Gregory full disability benefits
past the age of 65.45 The court found that Gregory had a reliance interest in
full disability benefits beyond the age of 65 and that WSI had a valid
obligation to pay those benefits.46
Ultimately, the rule derived from Kallhoff and Gregory by the North
Dakota Supreme Court is that injured claimants that receive total disability
benefits before the enactment of the statutory retirement offset or retirement
presumption have a reliance interest in continued disability benefits and the
WSI has a valid obligation to pay these continued disability benefits.47
Therefore, these provisions may not be applied to such claimants and any
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. (citing 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 614, § 10).
Id. (citing 1995 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 623, § 1).
1998 ND 94, 578 N.W.2d 101.
Tedford, ¶ 14, 738 N.W.2d at 33.
Id. ¶ 15 (citing Gregory, ¶ 34, 578 N.W.2d at 110).
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. ¶ 17, 738 N.W.2d at 34.
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statutory amendments do not apply retroactively to either abrogate or
change the obligation of WSI to pay these benefits.48
In the present case, WSI argued that the decisions in Kallhoff and
Gregory did not apply because unlike Tedford’s situation which involved a
guaranteed continuation of benefits in an amount at least equal to that
received prior to the offset, these cases involved a complete discontinuation
of all disability benefits.49 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
noted that the question at issue was not whether Tedford could still collect
benefits.50 Instead, at issue was what Tedford had a right to expect and
what WSI had an obligation to pay upon Tedford becoming totally disabled
in April of 1989, prior to both the 1989 and 1993 amendments.51
When Tedford was determined to be totally disabled in April of 1989,
the retirement offset provision did not exist, so Tedford had a right to
expect to receive full disability benefits and WSI had a valid obligation to
pay these benefits.52 However, an artificial offset provision had been
applied to reduce Tedford’s benefits from WSI.53 If that artificial offset
provision had not been applied to his benefits, Tedford would have
expected to receive and would have received full disability benefits.54
Therefore, upon reaching retirement age, Tedford had a reasonable expectation that the offset provision would end and he would receive his full
benefits.55
The court also noted that WSI had a valid obligation to pay Tedford’s
full benefits without an offset when Tedford’s SSDI benefits automatically
converted to retirement benefits upon reaching the age of retirement. 56
Based on these determinations, the court found that the mere fact the 1993
amendments to Section 65-05-09.2 enabled Tedford to continue to receive
the same amount of benefits, did not lead to a different result than that
reached in Kallhoff and Gregory.57 Ultimately, the court held that Kallhoff
and Gregory controlled and that Section 65-05-09.2 did not reduce
Tedford’s claim for full disability benefits.58

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20, 738 N.W.2d at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
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On appeal, WSI also argued that the district court’s decision that
“WSI’s legal arguments were not substantially justified” and its award of
attorney fees and costs under Section 28-32-50(1) were erroneous.59 Under
Section 28-32-50(1), if an administrative agency acts without substantial
justification, a court must award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
prevailing claimant.60 The North Dakota Supreme Court has concluded that
Section 28-32-50 “applies to WSI if it denies or reduces an employee’s
benefits without substantial justification.”61
In Lamplighter Lounge, Inc. v. State ex rel. Heitkamp,62 the court
summarized the standard for determining “substantial justification” under
Section 28-32-50.63 In defining “substantial justification,” the North
Dakota Supreme Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court’s
definition of “substantially justified.”64 This definition focuses on a justification that would satisfy a reasonable person.65 In this context, a party’s
position may be incorrect yet still be found to be substantially justified if a
reasonable person could find that it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.66
In Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Insurance,67 the court further explained
the application of Section 28-32-50 by indicating that it only applies in rare
situations when WSI acts without substantial justification.68 The court
noted that the purpose of the statute was to provide relief at the state level
that is the same as that provided by Congress through the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA).69 Analogous to its federal counterpart, which places
the burden on the government, the court has placed the burden under this
statute on the agency “to prove it acted with substantial justification.”70
Generally, when construing the EAJA, federal courts have found that
the acceptance of the government’s position by another federal judge is persuasive evidence of the position’s substantial justification.71 Furthermore,
the North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that the WSI’s ability to
59. Id. ¶ 23.
60. Id. ¶ 24.
61. Id. at 35-36 (citing Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2006 ND 221, ¶ 16, 723 N.W.2d
403, 407).
62. 523 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1994).
63. Tedford, ¶ 25, 738 N.W.2d at 36 (citing Lamplighter, 523 N.W.2d at 75).
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Aggie Investments G.P. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 470 N.W.2d 805, 814 (N.D.
1991)).
66. Id.
67. 2006 ND 221, 723 N.W.2d 403.
68. Tedford, ¶ 26, 738 N.W.2d at 36 (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407-08).
71. Id. ¶ 27, 738 N.W.2d at 37.
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convince a district judge of its position’s correctness provides strong
indication that the position would be accepted by a reasonable person as
correct and therefore be substantially justified.72 However, even though
this acceptance of the agency or the government’s position serves as
evidence of substantial justification, this evidence is not dispositive and an
analysis of the government or agency’s position is still required.73 The
district court’s determination of whether the agency acts with substantial
justification is discretionary and an abuse of discretion standard is
employed on appeal.74
In the present case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
district court’s decision that WSI’s actions were not substantially justified
amounted to an abuse of discretion.75 The lower court proceedings were
based on unsettled areas of law and WSI presented facially reasonable
arguments as to the interpretation of the statute.76 Furthermore, the first
district court decision accepted WSI’s position, which constituted persuasive evidence that the position would be found to have a reasonable basis in
law and fact by a reasonable person.77 Therefore, the court found that the
district court’s decision that WSI’s position was not substantially justified
and the court’s award of attorney fees and costs under Section 28-32-50(1)
were an abuse of discretion.78
The court denied Tedford’s motion on appeal for attorney fees and
costs under Section 28-32-50(1) and found the parties’ remaining arguments on appeal without merit.79 Ultimately, the court “affirm[ed] the
amended judgment, reverse[d] the district court’s order awarding Tedford
attorney fees and costs under [section] 28-32-50(1), and den[ied] Tedford’s
motion for attorney fees and costs under [section] 28-32-50(1) for the
appeal.”80
Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority’s opinion.81 Justice
Kapsner noted that the Kallhoff court refused to apply Section 65-05-09.2

72. Id. (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407).
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 26, 738 N.W.2d at 36-37 (citing Rojas, ¶ 18, 723 N.W.2d at 408; Hamich, Inc. v.
State, 1997 ND 110, ¶ 44, 564 N.W.2d 640, 650; Lamplighter Lounge, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D. 1994)).
75. Id. ¶ 28, 738 N.W.2d at 37.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶ 29.
79. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
80. Id. ¶ 31.
81. Id. ¶ 34, 738 N.W.2d at 38 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
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of the North Dakota Century Code because of an ambiguity in the statute.82
Justice Kapsner indicated that the legislature has since clearly stated that it
intends to apply this section to individuals in Tedford’s situation.83
In her dissent, Justice Kapsner also disagreed with the majority in its
determination that Gregory resulted in an impediment to the application of
Section 65-05-09.2.84 The decision in Gregory held that disability benefits
could not be terminated under Section 65-05-09.3, but the application of
Section 65-05-09.2 to Tedford did not terminate his benefits.85
Justice Kapsner further contended that Tedford did not provide any
authority upon which to prove that it was not permissible for the offset
provision to be applied to his benefits.86 After all, as Justice Kapsner noted,
Tedford would receive the same amount of money he had been receiving—
when his disability benefits were offset by his social security disability
benefits—when his social security retirement benefits were offset.87
Therefore, unlike the majority, Justice Kapsner would instead reverse the
district court’s decision and reinstate the WSI’s decision to “offset
Tedford’s social security retirement benefits against his disability benefits
under [Section] 65-05-09.2.”88

82.
1992)).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. ¶ 35 (citing Kallhoff v. N.D. Workers’ Comp. Bureau, 484 N.W.2d 510, 514 (N.D.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id.
Id. ¶ 38.
Id.
Id.

576

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:567

CIVIL PROCEDURE—MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL—
ARTICULATING THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD
GISVOLD V. WINDBREAK, INC.
In Gisvold v. Windbreak, Inc.,89 Joelle Gisvold appealed a district
court’s decision to deny her motion for a new trial and dismiss her negligence action against Windbreak, Inc.90 The decision arose after a jury
failed to find Windbreak, Inc. at fault for Gisvold’s injuries.91 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for reconsideration under the correct standard, because the court could not
determine if the correct legal standard had been applied.92
While at the Windbreak Saloon & Casino in Fargo, Gisvold claimed
that she slipped and fell while dancing, which resulted in serious injuries to
her right wrist.93 Gisvold argued that Windbreak, the owner and operator of
the saloon and casino, breached its duty to its customers to provide a safe
dance floor based on the Windbreak’s manager’s admission that he used too
much wax on the floor, which caused it to become slippery.94 Gisvold
further claimed that Windbreak failed to warn customers of this dangerous
condition.95
In its defense, Windbreak asserted that it was not liable for the injuries
Gisvold sustained because it did not breach its duty of care.96 Windbreak
claimed that its manager did not use excessive wax on the floor.97 Furthermore, Windbreak argued that the manager’s testimony regarding the
amount of wax used was impeached because the manager quit working for
Windbreak and believed that Windbreak owed him money that he did not
receive.98
A jury found that Windbreak was not at fault for the damages being
claimed by Gisvold and Gisvold moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule
59(b)(6) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.99 Gisvold claimed

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

2007 ND 54, 730 N.W.2d 597.
Gisvold, ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 597.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
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that the jury’s special verdict was not justified by sufficient evidence, but
the district court denied the motion.100
Upon appeal, Gisvold contended that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial.101 Gisvold argued that
this denial was “arbitrary, unconscionable, and unreasonable” because the
court said it would have granted judgment for her, did not weigh the
evidence, and did not judge the witness’ credibility pursuant to Rule
59(b)(6).102 Gisvold claimed that the district court should have exercised its
independent legal discretion and that the evidence only supported a verdict
in her favor.103 Windbreak contended, however, that even if the court
asserted it would have reached a different result than the jury, the court still
found that the verdict was supported by the evidence.104
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the standard for a district
court’s consideration of motions for new trials has lacked precision in the
past.105 Therefore, the court used this decision to “articulate and clarify”
the correct legal standard for this consideration.106 The standard is as
follows:
[A] district court considering a motion for a new trial based on
insufficiency of the evidence may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the jury, or act as a thirteenth juror when the evidence is
such that different persons would naturally and fairly come to
different conclusions, but may set aside a jury verdict when, in
considering and weighing all the evidence, the court’s judgment
tells it the verdict is wrong because it is manifestly against the
weight of the evidence.107
In this case, the district court did not issue a written memorandum
pursuant to Rule 59(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which
concisely stated the grounds upon which its ruling was based.108 Instead,
the district court denied Gisvold’s motion orally.109 The hearing transcript
of the district court’s decision technically complied with the written
memorandum requirement under Rule 59(f); however, this rule also

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 730 N.W.2d at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16, 730 N.W.2d at 603.
Id.
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requires that the grounds upon which the decision was based be concisely
stated.110
The North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the district
court’s statements manifested uncertainty with regard to the correct legal
standard.111 Some of the district court’s statements appeared to support the
verdict and to suggest that Gisvold failed to meet her burden of proof in
establishing negligence on the part of Windbreak.112 Other statements,
however, appeared to indicate that the district court incorrectly applied the
standard for the consideration of a motion for a new trial.113 Finally, some
of the district court’s statements reflected uncertainty as to the correct
standard to apply in the consideration of a motion for a new trial under Rule
59(b)(6) and the court’s oral decision failed to sufficiently explain the
court’s reasoning in the denial of Gisvold’s motion.114
The court was unable to determine if the correct legal standard had
been applied in the district court’s denial of Gisvold’s motion for a new
trial.115 Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial and
remanded the case to reconsider the motion for a new trial pursuant to the
correct legal standard.116
Justice Sandstrom concurred and dissented with the majority’s opinion
in the case.117 He concurred with the majority’s articulation of the standard
upon which a new trial will be granted, but believed the district court
applied the correct standard.118 Ultimately, he would have affirmed the
district court decision because it appeared that “any alternative standard
potentially applied by the district court [would be] more favorable to the
appellant than the correct standard.”119

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 604.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—PRETRIAL JUDGMENTS—DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS
IN RE J.C.
In In re J.C.,120 Z.C. appealed a juvenile court order, which found her
in default for not appearing at a hearing regarding her parental rights and
terminated her parental rights to J.C.121 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the juvenile court’s denial of Z.C.’s motion to continue was not an
abuse of discretion.122 However, the court found that the juvenile court
erred in its termination of Z.C.’s parental rights because it did not hear any
evidence that supported the termination.123 Therefore, the court reversed
the termination order of Z.C.’s parental rights and remanded the case.124
A social worker with the Cass County Social Services filed a petition to
terminate the parental rights of Z.C. to J.C., her 11-year old son, in June of
2006.125 Following the filing of the petition for termination of parental
rights, Z.C. motioned “to put the true facts as have been testified to
repeatedly.”126 Z.C. was then appointed counsel and mailed an order on
August 14, 2006, which set the trial date on the petition for September 29,
2006.127 Z.C. did not appear at the trial and her counsel asked to be
discharged upon moving for a seven- to ten-day continuance to appoint new
counsel.128 The juvenile court referee denied the motion for a continuance
and found Z.C. in default.129 The referee reasoned that the best interests of
J.C. would not be best served by a continuance, nor would it improve Z.C.’s
ability to appear or present a case.130 During the hearing, J.C.’s father
consented to the termination of his parental rights and the referee ultimately
terminated both parents’ rights to J.C.131
On appeal, Z.C. argued that the juvenile court’s decision to deny her
motion for a continuance to appoint new counsel constituted an abuse of
discretion.132 Z.C. claimed that despite the likelihood that the continuance

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

2007 ND 11, 736 N.W.2d 451.
J.C., ¶ 1, 736 N.W.2d at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
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would have lasted longer than seven to ten days, the denial of this
continuance was an abuse of discretion because the proceeding regarded the
termination of parental rights.133 However, Z.C. received notice over a
month before the scheduled start date of the trial on August 14, 2006, yet
did not act until the actual start date of September 29, 2006.134 Therefore,
the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court referee’s
decision to deny the continuance was “not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable and was not an abuse of discretion.”135
In her second argument on appeal, Z.C. contended that it was an error
for the juvenile court referee to find her in default and to terminate her
parental rights “without hearing any evidence to support the allegations in
the petition.”136 Z.C. claimed that the court instead relied on the allegations
included in the petition and argued that pleadings did not constitute
proof.137 In response, the State asserted that the three requirements for the
termination of parental rights under Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code were clearly and convincingly supported by the
evidence.138 Furthermore, the State averred that Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(2)
allowed the termination of parental rights because J.C. had been out of his
parents’ home for “450 of the previous 660 nights.”139
Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that parental rights may be terminated if the State proves by clear and
convincing evidence that: “(1) the child is deprived; (2) the causes and
conditions of that deprivation are likely to continue; and (3) the child is
suffering, or is likely to suffer, serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.”140 With regard to this provision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has noted that judicial notice may not be taken of testimony from
proceedings where termination was not an issue.141 However, when a termination of parental rights results from a culmination of prior proceedings,
the court does not have to operate in a vacuum as to the results of the prior
proceedings and “may take judicial notice of orders in prior proceedings.142
The court further noted that a court may also terminate parental rights
pursuant to Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(2) if “the child is deprived and in foster
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8, 736 N.W.2d at 455.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing In re D.M., 2007 ND 62, ¶ 7, 730 N.W.2d 604, 606).
Id.
Id.
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care or in the control, care, and custody of the state for 450 of the previous
660 nights.”143
In making its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it
had not yet adopted procedural rules specific to juvenile proceedings.144
However, the court looked to its procedures regarding the default of parties
that have appeared, which require “sufficient proof to enable a court to
determine and grant the relief, if any, to which the plaintiff may be entitled.”145 In this case, the court found that no evidentiary basis was present
to support the termination of parental rights by the juvenile court referee.146
Therefore, the court held that the juvenile court’s treatment of the proceeding as a default and the termination of Z.C.’s parental rights were errors
because no evidentiary support was present in the record to satisfy the
statutory requirements for termination under Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) or
(2).147 The North Dakota Supreme Court thereby reversed the order, which
terminated Z.C.’s parental rights, and remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with its opinion.148 Finally, the court also directed that the juvenile court hold a hearing within thirty days of the mandate of this case.149
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the opinion to address judicial
notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.150 He concurred specially to note that some of the court’s prior opinions created the
impression that “a less formal procedure than that set forth in Rule 201 [of
the Rules of Evidence] allowed the trial court to consider prior proceedings.”151 This opinion illustrated, however, that Rule 201’s application
of judicial notice is more than a mere mechanic exercise.152 After all, if a
trial judge fails, under Rule 201, to take formal notice of prior proceedings,
“those proceedings will not become part of the record for review on
appeal.”153 Based on this standard, Chief Justice VandeWalle believed it
would be inappropriate to bring the prior proceedings’ record before the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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153.

Id. ¶ 10 (citing In re F.F., 2006 ND 47, ¶ 18, 711 N.W.2d 144, 149).
Id. ¶ 13, 736 N.W.2d at 456.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18, 736 N.W.2d at 456-57.
Id. ¶ 19, 736 N.W.2d at 457.
Id. ¶ 20.
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court.154 He thought the record was unclear as to whether the juvenile court
considered the prior proceedings that led to the termination.155
CONTRACT LAW—CONTRACT INTERPRETATION—FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS
CAPITAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. CITY OF BISMARCK
Capital Electric Cooperative and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company
(MDU) argued that they were allowed to provide electric service to certain
customers in the City of Bismarck.156 Capital Electric appealed a court
judgment which denied appeal of a Bismarck City Commission decision.157
The Bismarck City Commission decision held that Bismarck’s electric
distribution franchise agreements allowed MDU, not Capital Electric, to
provide electric services to customers in the Boulder Ridge First Addition
in northwest Bismarck.158 MDU appealed a district court judgment affirming a Public Service Commission (PSC) decision ordering MDU not to
provide Boulder Ridge electric services.159 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that both utility companies are authorized by their franchise
agreement to provide electric services to Boulder Ridge and that PSC’s
decision controls the distribution of services in Boulder Ridge.160 The court
reversed the judgment in Capital Electric’s appeal and affirmed the
judgment in MDU’s appeal.161
Bismarck, a home rule city with an ordinance requiring electric service
providers to have a franchise to provide services within the city, adopted a
resolution in 1987 which renewed a twenty-year non-exclusive franchise
allowing MDU to operate an electric distribution system in Bismarck as
“now, or hereafter constituted.”162 MDU’s franchise did not have any
geographical limitations.163
Bismarck granted a twenty-year non-exclusive franchise to Capital
Electric in 1973 and 1993; Capital Electric’s franchise was different from
MDU’s because it included a geographic limitation.164 The limitation restricted the franchise “to areas within the city described in the Area Service
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Capital Elec. Coop. v. Bismarck, 2007 ND 128, ¶ 1, 736 N.W.2d 788, 790.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
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Agreement Dated July 5, 1973.”165 The agreement provided that MDU
would serve customers within an area bound by a heavy dashed black line
on an attached map; MDU would continue to serve areas surrounding and
encompassing the City of Bismarck.166 The agreement further provided that
Capital Electric would continue to serve its existing customers within the
black dashed line and serve new customers outside the heavy dashed black
line.167 Additionally, Capital Electric would serve rural areas not receiving
central station services and other areas specifically identified in the agreement.168 The agreement was subject to cancellation by either party upon
twelve months notice.169
The Boulder Ridge First Addition was annexed in April 2005.170
Capital Electric provided electric service to at least part of Boulder Ridge
prior to the annexation.171 The Boulder Ridge area is outside of the heavy
dashed black line on the map attached to the service agreement and was
located in Capital Electric’s principal service area under the agreement.172
After the annexation, both MDU and Capital Electric sought to provide
electric service to the new customers in Boulder Ridge.173
MDU petitioned the Bismarck City Commission (Commission) in
August 2006 for a declaration of MDU’s franchise right to provide electric
service to Boulder Ridge.174 The Commission issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law in November 2005 on MDU’s petition after the hearing,
but before a subsequent special meeting.175 The Commission concluded
that it was authorized to resolve the franchise questions and related
issues.176
The Commission explained that both MDU and Capital Electric offered
different opinions on the meaning of the franchises and the area service
agreement and the Commission held that the area service agreement was
ambiguous.177 The Commission considered extrinsic evidence that indicated the parties’ intent that Capital Electric have a limited presence in the

165.
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167.
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Id. ¶ 4, 736 N.W.2d at 791.
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Id. ¶ 5, 736 N.W.2d at 792.
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city and that MDU was to be the primary electric service supplier.178 From
this evidence, the Commission concluded that MDU was meant to remain
the primary electric provider in the city for all customers except for Capital
Electric’s existing customers.179 The Commission did not believe that the
attached map was meant to be in place for forty years without amendment
because if that were the case Capital Electric would be the exclusive provider for all new areas added to the city outside the lines in the original
Area Service Agreement.180 Instead, the lines on the Area Service Agreement were supposed to move outward as Bismarck grew.181 Based upon
these findings, the Bismarck City Commission held that MDU was to provide electric service to new Boulder Ridge customers and existing customers were to remain with Capital Electric.182
Capital Electric brought a declaratory judgment action against
Bismarck, MDU, and the PSC in November 2005 seeking a declaration of
Capital Electric’s franchise rights.183 The district court held that declaratory
relief was not an available remedy and treated Capital Electric’s action as
an appeal.184 The judge held in a March 2006 decision that Bismarck’s
interpretation of the franchise was “not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”185 The court then dismissed Capital Electric’s declaratory judgment
action and denied Capital Electric’s appeal in June 2006.186
In September 2005, Capital Electric filed a separate complaint with the
PSC against MDU under Section 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century
Code’s Territorial Integrity Act.187 In the complaint, Capital Electric
sought to enjoin MDU from providing electric services to Boulder Ridge.188
In a June 2006 split decision, the PSC found that MDU’s extension of its
facilities into Boulder Ridge “interfered with and constituted an unreasonable duplication of Capital Electric’s available [Boulder Ridge] facilities
and services.”189 The PSC ordered MDU to stop extending its electric
services in Boulder Ridge.190 The PSC further ordered that MDU stop
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providing service to Boulder Ridge customers and sell its Boulder Ridge
electric distribution facilities to Capital Electric.191 The district court
affirmed PSC’s decision in October 2006.192 The North Dakota Supreme
Court stayed the October 2006 PSC decision and consolidated it with
Capital Electric’s appeal.193
Capital Electric argued in its appeal that the district court erred when
deciding that declaratory relief was not an available remedy in the challenge
of the Bismarck decision.194 Capital Electric cited Section 32-23-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code which authorizes a declaratory judgment action
for the construction of a franchise.195 Additionally, Capital Electric argued
that the district court erred by treating the declaratory judgment action as an
appeal because no statutes authorize an appeal and, in the absence of statutory authorization, declaratory relief is available to challenge the Bismarck
interpretation of the franchise.196 Finally, Capital Electric argued that it was
authorized by its franchise to “provide electric services to areas within its
principal service area, which is [the area] outside the heavy dashed black
line on the map attached to the area service agreement,” even as those areas
were annexed to Bismarck.197
In response, Bismarck and MDU argued that Capital Electric was not
seeking a declaratory relief because such a claim must seek a declaration of
rights before the rights have been violated.198 Instead, Capital Electric was
challenging Bismarck’s interpretation of the franchises.199 MDU and
Bismarck additionally argued that the line on the map was intended to move
outward with new areas and that MDU should have exclusive rights to the
new customers in Boulder Ridge.200 Bismarck and MDU also argued that
the appeal was authorized by Section 27-05-06(4) and chapter 28-34 of the
North Dakota Century Code.201 Finally, Bismarck and MDU argued that
Capital Electric was not prejudiced by the district court’s decision to treat
the claim as an appeal because the standard of arbitrary, capricious and
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unreasonable was the same in either an appeal or a declaratory judgment
action.202
The court explained that municipalities possess only those powers
granted by either the North Dakota Constitution, statute or as necessarily
implied from an express grant.203 The court then established Bismarck’s
authority to grant franchises under article seven, Section 11 of the North
Dakota Constitution.204 This constitutional provision gives Bismarck the
power to franchise the construction and operation of public utilities and
restricts the legislature from abridging such power.205 Furthermore, Section
40-05-01(57) of the North Dakota Century Code authorizes the municipality governing body to grant and extend franchises for periods of time not
to exceed twenty years subject to the regulatory powers of the governing
body.206 In this case, the court explained that if both MDU and Capital
Electric had franchise rights to Boulder Ridge, the PSC had authority to
decide whether the services of one would unreasonably duplicate the services of the other under Section 49-03-01.3.207
The court used concepts of contract law in its analysis of Capital
Electric’s appeal.208 The court explained that a franchise is a contract and
the interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is independently
examined and interpreted on appeal to determine if it was erroneously construed.209 The court then offered the statutory basis of contract interpretation in North Dakota.210 The court explained that unless otherwise
provided, public and private contracts are interpreted by the same rules of
interpretation.211 Furthermore, the contract’s language governs its interpretation unless the contract is unclear, ambiguous or absurd.212 The purpose
of interpreting the contract is to determine the parties’ intent at the time
they signed the contract based upon the writing itself, if possible.213 Words
in the contract are considered in their ordinary and popular sense.214 If the
contract is found to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence can be considered to
202. Id.
203. Id. ¶ 12.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. ¶ 13; Cass County Elec. Coop v. N.S.P., 419 N.W.2d 181, 187 (ND 1988); N.S.P. v.
P.S.C., 452 N.W.2d 340, 345 (ND 1990).
208. Capital Elec., ¶¶ 15-17, 736 N.W.2d at 795.
209. Id. ¶ 15.
210. Id. ¶ 16.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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show intent for an ambiguity, but not to contradict the written language.215
After establishing these principles, the court analyzed Capital Electric’s
claim.216
The court did not decide whether the district court erred when treating
the action as an appeal; instead the court found that the district court incorrectly interpreted the controlling law regarding Capital Electric’s franchise.217 For this reason, the court concluded that Bismarck’s interpretation
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.218 The court began by examining the language of the agreement between MDU and Capital Electric.219
The plain language of the agreement allowed Capital Electric to serve new
customers within the heavy dashed black line and provided that Capital
Electric’s principal service area was the area outside the heavy dashed black
line, which included Boulder Ridge.220 Bismarck interpreted the agreement
to mean MDU was the main provider within Bismarck and that the lines
would move outward as Bismarck grew.221 Furthermore, the court noted
that Bismarck said it did not intend for Capital Electric to be the exclusive
electric supplier for new areas of town, but that MDU would serve in that
capacity.222
With these considerations, the court found that Bismarck’s interpretation of the franchise ignored the plain meaning of the agreement.223
Nothing in the plain language allowed either entity to be the exclusive provider of electric services in Boulder Ridge upon annexation; instead the
plain language gave both providers a non-exclusive franchise.224 The geographical limitation in Capital Electric’s franchise and attached map
specifically authorized Capital Electric to serve Boulder Ridge.225 Furthermore, the court explained that nothing in the plain language suggested that
the lines on the map were meant to grow as the city grew.226 Instead, the
service agreement specified that if the agreement was canceled by the other
party, “all privileges, rights, obligations and restrictions as therein stated
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shall continue to apply to both.”227 Bismarck’s reliance upon extrinsic
evidence from the 1960s was misplaced in proving the intent in 1973 and
1993 because evidence should show the intent at the time of contracting.228
Capital Electric did not receive its franchise from Bismarck in the 1960s; it
received it in 1973.229
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the non-exclusive
franchises when considered as a whole within the area service agreement,
authorized both Capital Electric and MDU to provide services to Bismarck
“now, or hereafter constituted.”230 The court explained that Capital Electric
was not restricted from serving Boulder Ridge by its franchise.231 The
effect of both Capital Electric and MDU’s franchises to serve Boulder
Ridge constituted an unreasonable duplication and was subject to the PSC
under Section 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century Code.232
The Court held that in the absence of explicit language providing
otherwise, interpretation favors the public interest in preventing unreasonable duplication of facilities while recognizing a municipality’s constitutional right to grant a franchise.233 In this case, Bismarck exercised its
constitutional right by granting both Capital Electric and MDU a franchise
for Boulder Ridge.234 The court concluded that Bismarck erred in construing the franchise to preclude Capital Electric from providing electric
service to Boulder Ridge.235 The court held that both Capital Electric and
MDU had franchises to serve Boulder Ridge and reversed the district
court’s judgment in Capital Electric’s appeal.236
The court rejected many of the arguments in MDU’s appeal because
these arguments were founded upon the premise that Capital Electric did
not have a right to serve Boulder Ridge.237 Because both MDU and Capital
Electric had a right to provide service, the PSC had jurisdiction under Section 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century Code.238 The court explained
that when determining interference with existing services, the PSC must
look to the existing electric facilities that the rural electric cooperative and
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the public utility have in the area and determine whether there is a an
unreasonable duplication of capital-intensive facilities and services by the
other entity.239 After examining the facilities and services that Capital
Electric had provided Boulder Ridge, the court held that a reasonable mind
could have found that PSC’s findings were supported by the evidence and
the record.240 Therefore, the court ultimately affirmed the district court
judgment affirming the PSC decision.241
CRIMINAL LAW—ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE & LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES
STATE V. ROGERS
Joseph Rogers appealed a criminal judgment finding him guilty of
sexual assault and criminal trespass.242 The North Dakota Supreme Court’s
holding consisted of two parts. First, the court found that Rogers’ sexual
assault conviction under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b) of the North Dakota
Century Code was not supported by sufficient evidence of a mental disease
or defect.243 The court therefore reversed the guilty verdict as to the sexual
assault charge and remanded the case to dismiss count two of the information.244 Second, the court agreed with the district court’s decision to
prohibit a “lesser-included jury instruction” as to the criminal trespass
charge.245 As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s criminal
judgment based upon the guilty verdict for the criminal trespass charge.246
From the evening of July 20, 2004 through the morning of July 21,
2004, Rogers was employed at a Minot hotel, where the victim was a
guest.247 After going to a few bars, the victim returned to the hotel and did
not have her hotel room key.248 Rogers walked her to her room and opened
the door using the hotel’s master key.249 The hotel’s master key accessed
the victim’s room four additional times in the early morning.250 The
victim’s testimony indicated that “she had no memory from the time she
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entered her hotel room to some point in the morning when she saw Rogers
adjusting his clothing.”251
Rogers claimed that when the victim returned to the hotel, she talked to
him, including asking him to order a pizza, and they smoked cigarettes
together.252 According to Rogers, the victim hugged and kissed him, then
invited him to her hotel room where they engaged in sexual intercourse.253
Rogers further alleged that the victim instructed him to return to her room
to wake her later in the morning.254 Rogers stated that he returned to her
room, where he shook her and touched her private areas while she was
asleep.255
Following these events, Rogers was charged with the offenses of
sexual assault and criminal trespass.256 During his jury trial, Rogers was
convicted of a class C felony sexual assault pursuant to Section 12.1-2007(b) and a class C felony criminal trespass pursuant to Section 12.1-2203(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.257
On appeal, Rogers made two arguments.258 First, Rogers argued that
the guilty verdict for the class C felony sexual assault charge was not
supported by sufficient evidence.259 Second, Rogers argued that the trial
court’s decision to “allow a lesser-included jury instruction on the criminal
trespass charge” was incorrect.260
Rogers’s first argument alleged that he could not be convicted of a
class C felony sexual assault charge under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b)
because there was insufficient evidence that “the victim suffered from a
mental disease or defect.”261 The State argued instead that the victim’s
intoxication constituted a mental disease or defect.262 Section 12.1-2007(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
1. A person who knowingly has sexual contact with another
person, or who causes another person to have sexual contact with
that person, is guilty of an offense if:
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...
b. That person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that
the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which
renders that other person incapable of understanding the
nature of that other person’s conduct[.]263
This section fails to define “mental disease or defect.”264
The State argued that the victim’s intoxication, which led to unconsciousness, constituted a mental disease or defect.265 The trial court’s jury
instruction specifically stated that intoxication in and of itself did not constitute a mental disease or defect.266 Neither Rogers nor the State objected
to this jury instruction itself and the jury instruction became the law of the
case.267 Therefore, under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b), Rogers could not be
found guilty of sexual assault by a rational factfinder and the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed his conviction of class C felony sexual assault
pursuant to Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b).268 Furthermore, the court noted that
the State could not retry Rogers for sexual assault under the statute based on
the principles of double jeopardy and remanded the case to the district court
to dismiss the sexual assault charge in the information.269
As to his second argument on appeal, Rogers claimed that “he should
have received a lesser-included offense jury instruction on the class A misdemeanor criminal trespass charge.”270 Rogers was convicted of class C
felony criminal trespass under Section 12.1-22-03(1), which states that
“knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains
in a dwelling or in highly secured premises.”271 Rogers argued that he was
guilty of a lesser charge pursuant to Section 12.1-22-03(2)(a) of the North
Dakota Century Code because the victim’s hotel room constituted an
occupied structure, not a dwelling.272

263. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(1)(b) (2001).
264. Rogers, ¶ 9, 730 N.W.2d at 862.
265. Id.
266. Id. This provision was in accordance with Section 12.1-04-02, which states that “[i]ntoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease or defect.” Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-04-02 (1997)).
267. Id. ¶ 10, 730 N.W.2d at 863. “Unchallenged jury instructions become the law of the
case.” Id. (quoting State v. Wolff, 512 N.W.2d 670, 675 (N.D. 1994)).
268. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
269. Id. ¶ 11. If Rogers was prosecuted again under Section 12.1-20-07, it would “place
Rogers in jeopardy again for sexual assault.” Id.
270. Id. ¶ 13.
271. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-03(1) (2001)) (emphasis added).
272. Id. ¶ 13. Section 12.1-22-06(4)(a)-(b) defines an “occupied structure” as “[a] structure
or vehicle . . . [w]here any person lives or carries on business or other calling; or . . . [w]hich is
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The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the term “dwelling”
includes a hotel room because the definition of dwelling includes a place of
lodging.273 Furthermore, the court determined that Section 12.1-2203(2)(a) is not a lesser-included offense of Section 12.1-22-03(1).274 To be
a lesser included offense, “it must be impossible to commit the greater
offense without committing the lesser.”275 In this case, it would not be
impossible for the “‘greater’ offense of trespassing in a dwelling or highly
secured premises [to take place] without committing the ‘lesser’ offense of
trespassing in any building, occupied structure, or storage structure.”276
Therefore, the district court’s decision to not permit the lesser-included jury
instruction was not an error and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
Rogers’ conviction for criminal trespass.277
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed Rogers’
conviction of class C felony sexual assault under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b)
and remanded the case for the dismissal of count two of the Information.278
As to the charge of criminal trespass, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s conviction.279
CRIMINAL LAW—MOTOR VEHICLES—SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS
STATE V. HAHNE
In State v. Hahne,280 the State of North Dakota appealed a district court
order that suppressed evidence in the case of Denise Hahne, who had been
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.281 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found that the district court’s decision was based on an
erroneous view of the law, specifically “that law enforcement must provide
motorists with an opportunity to avoid temporary checkpoints.”282 The

used for overnight accommodation of persons.” Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2206(4)(a)-(b)).
273. Id. ¶ 12. The language of Section 12.1-05-12(2) defines “dwelling” as “any building or
structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is for the time being a
person’s home or place of lodging.” Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-12(2) (2001)).
274. Id. ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d at 864.
275. Id. ¶ 14, 730 N.W.2d at 863 (quoting State v. Keller, 2005 ND 86, ¶ 31, 695 N.W.2d
703, 711).
276. Id. ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d at 864.
277. Id.
278. Id. ¶ 16.
279. Id.
280. 2007 ND 116, 736 N.W.2d 483.
281. Hahne, ¶ 1, 736 N.W.2d at 484.
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court therefore reversed the suppression order and remanded the case to the
district court to apply the appropriate legal standard.283
On August 18, 2006 in Bismarck, the State Highway Patrol operated a
sobriety checkpoint located at the East Main and Bismarck Expressway
intersection.284 After failing to stop at the checkpoint, Hahne received a
citation at 9:50 p.m. from the State Highway Patrol for driving under the
influence of alcohol.285
Following a hearing, the district court found that the Highway Patrol
officers “followed a well prepared operational order,” but suppressed all of
the evidence obtained by Hahne’s stop.286 The district court based this
suppression on its finding that no safe and legal way to avoid the checkpoint was available.287 The State appealed the district court’s suppression
order.288
Upon appeal, the State argued that the district court erred in suppressing evidence of Hahne’s intoxication because the decision was based
solely on drivers’ ability to see and avoid checkpoints, implying that checkpoints must provide a means by which motorists can avoid them.289 The
State further claimed that this ruling hindered the purpose of sobriety
checkpoints, which is “to reduce alcohol-related fatalities on [] roadways.”290
The issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was “whether the
district court, in granting Hahne’s motion to suppress evidence, relied on an
erroneous assumption that law enforcement must, as a matter of law,
provide a legal opportunity for motorists to avoid such checkpoints.”291
The court noted that “[a] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a
vehicle is stopped by police at a checkpoint”292 and relied upon the United

283. Id.
284. Id. ¶ 3.
285. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. At the site of the citation, officers obtained a blood alcohol level of .092
percent from Hahne; following a later blood draw, she was found to have a blood alcohol level of
0.13 percent. Id. ¶ 2.
286. Id. ¶ 3.
287. Id. Instead, upon notice of the checkpoint, the court found that the only outlet was a
potentially dangerous “U-turn at night on a curving road with a 50 m.p.h. speed limit.” Id.
288. Id. ¶ 4, 736 N.W.2d at 485. The district court had jurisdiction in the case pursuant to
Section 39-20-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. ¶ 5.
289. Id. ¶ 6.
290. Id. Hahne also contended, for the first time on appeal, that the State did not prove the
effectiveness of the checkpoint. Id. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address
the issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal and therefore not properly preserved.
Id. ¶ 7, 736 N.W.2d at 486.
291. Id. ¶ 8.
292. Id. ¶ 6, 736 N.W.2d at 485 (quoting State v. Albaugh, 1997 ND 229, ¶ 6, 571 N.W.2d
345).
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States Supreme Court decision of Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz293
in its decision.294
In Sitz, the United States Supreme Court applied the three-part
balancing test established in Brown v. Texas295 in finding a Michigan sobriety checkpoint program constitutional.296 The three-part balancing test includes: “(1) ‘a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure,’ (2) ‘the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,’
and (3) ‘the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’”297 As to
the first factor of the Brown test, Sitz recognized that the problem of drunk
driving and the importance of a State’s interest in eliminating that problem
could not be disputed.298
The Sitz Court found that the second factor of the Brown test had also
been met.299 This factor, which requires an analysis of “the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest,” was essentially characterized by
the Court as requiring an analysis of the “effectiveness” of the checkpoint.300 The Sitz Court determined that this effectiveness analysis does not
necessitate a searching examination to the extent present in the case, which
required a determination of the “ratio between the number of cars stopped
and the number of actual arrests.”301 Instead, the Court found that in the
case of a Fourth Amendment analysis, deference will be given to the
manner in which a checkpoint is executed.302
Finally, as to the third factor in the Brown test, the Sitz Court
concluded that the intrusion resulting from the checkpoint at issue was
slight.303 The Court acknowledged that the intrusion had an objective
component—comprised of the stop’s duration and the interrogation’s
intensity—and a subjective component—characterized as the fear and
surprise that the stop causes in law-abiding motorists.304 The Court focused

293. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
294. Hahne, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d at 486.
295. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
296. Hahne, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d at 486.
297. Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51). The central concern in balancing these factors
is “assuring that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at
51). Therefore, this concern requires that a sobriety checkpoint be “carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Id.
298. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451).
299. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 486-87.
303. Id. ¶ 12, 736 N.W.2d at 487 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451).
304. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52).
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on the subjective component and ultimately determined that this intrusion
was minimal because the stop was executed by uniformed officers who
were following pre-established guidelines.305
In making this determination, the Sitz majority noted that the Michigan
courts had misread the Court’s previous decisions.306 With regard to the
subjective intrusion, the lower courts had focused on the fear and surprise
that resulted when drunk drivers became aware of the possibility of being
stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.307 The Court, however, noted that the fear
and surprise that is to be taken into consideration is the fear and surprise
experienced by law-abiding motorists as a result of the stop.308 Ultimately,
the Sitz Court held that stationary checkpoints, which are visible to motorists from a distance and operated by uniformed officers pursuant to established guidelines, do not generate an undue amount of fear or surprise to
law-abiding motorists.309 Therefore, these checkpoints do not result in an
unconstitutional subjective intrusion of a motorist’s personal liberties.310
In addition to its analysis of Sitz, the North Dakota Supreme Court also
referred to City of Bismarck v. Uhden 311 in its decision.312 The court noted
that its decision in Uhden “did not challenge the constitutionality of the
checkpoint on the basis of the degree of intrusion into his individual liberty.”313 However, the decision addressed how a checkpoint’s visibility may
affect an intrusion by noting that this factor is not conclusive in and of
itself, but is instead “one relevant factor in the analysis of the stop.”314
In Hahne, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the district
court’s decision that a checkpoint was invalid because it failed to provide a
safe and legal means of avoidance, implied that as a matter of law, law enforcement was required to provide motorists a way by which to avoid these
checkpoints or roadblocks.315 Based on Sitz and its progeny, the court held
that avoidability is not wholly determinative of the “constitutional reasonableness of a checkpoint.”316 Instead, it is one factor to be considered in the

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453).
Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453).
Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452).
513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).
Hahne, ¶ 13, 736 N.W.2d at 488.
Id.
Id. (quoting Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 378 n.8).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
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evaluation of the intrusion upon individual motorists’ personal liberty.317
Therefore, the district court decision was reversed and remanded to
determine “whether the checkpoint Hahne encountered was constitutionally
reasonable.”318
CRIMINAL LAW—NIGHTTIME WARRANTS—INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
ROTH V. STATE
Todd A. Roth appealed a district court order denying his application for
post-conviction relief.319 Roth argued that his trial and appellate counsel
were plainly ineffective for not challenging the nighttime provision in a
warrant permitting the search of his home.320
Roth was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and the manufacture of a controlled substance by the
State after law enforcement searched his home with a warrant during the
early morning hours of August 28, 2002.321 Roth’s counsel filed a motion
to suppress all evidence discovered in the search arguing that the warrant
was not supported by probable cause and contained an invalid no-knock
provision.322 The district court denied the motion.323 Roth then entered a
conditional guilty plea to the charges, but reserved his right to appeal the
suppression motion determination.324 Roth, retaining his trial counsel to
represent him on appeal, again argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court
that the warrant lacked probable cause and that the no-knock provision was
invalid, but the Court affirmed the original judgment.325
Roth filed an application for post conviction relief in January 2005.326
In his application, Roth raised multiple issues related to the legality of the
search and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.327
The district court concluded that these issues were already raised on direct
appeal and rejected his application for post-conviction relief.328 Roth
appealed this judgment and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Roth v. State, 2007 ND 112, ¶ 1, 735 N.W.2d 882, 886.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
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district court order denying post-conviction relief.329 The court held that
Roth was barred from raising issues directly related to the issuance and
execution of the search warrant, but that the district court should have considered the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.330 The
court remanded the case to the district court to examine this claim.331
The district court considered Roth’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on remand by examining the record.332 Roth argued that his counsel failed to raise the issue of whether the police exercised the no-knock
provision of the warrant.333 He further argued that his counsel failed to
challenge the nighttime provision of the search warrant both at the suppression hearing and on direct appeal.334
The district court found that Roth’s counsel was not ineffective as to
the issue of whether law enforcement entered using the no-knock provision
because he adequately raised the issue in his suppression motion reply
brief.335 The district court found that Roth’s counsel did not challenge the
validity of the nighttime provision of the search warrant, but the court did
not decide whether the provision was supported by probable cause.336
Instead, the district court found that the evidence would have been admissible regardless because of the inevitable discovery doctrine.337 For this
reason, the district court concluded that Roth did not prove that the evidence obtained from the nighttime search would be suppressed if his counsel had acted differently.338 Therefore, the district court determined that
Roth did not prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his
application for post-conviction relief was denied.339 Roth renewed his
appeal on the grounds that his counsel failed to challenge the legality of the
nighttime search warrant.340
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel.341 The issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mix of both questions of law and of
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fact.342 The petitioner bears a heavy burden to prevail in a post-conviction
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.343 The petition must show that
the counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.344
To meet the first prong, the petitioner must surpass a strong presumption that his representation fell within range of reasonable performance
considering the circumstances of the case and show that the errors were so
egregious as to not comply with the standards set forth by the prevailing
professional standards and thus the Constitution.345 To meet the second
prong, the petitioner must show that the results would have been different
but for the unprofessional errors of counsel.346 Failure to file a pretrial
suppression motion is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel; instead
the petitioner must show actual prejudice.347
Roth argued that he would have prevailed on the suppression motion if
his counsel had raised the issue of whether it was supported by probable
cause and that the court erroneously applied the inevitable discovery
doctrine in the case.348 The North Dakota Supreme Court examined Roth’s
claim that he would have prevailed if his attorney had raised the probable
cause issue to determine whether he suffered actual prejudice because of his
attorney’s actions.349 Rule 41(c)(1)(E) of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows a magistrate to issue a nighttime search warrant
only if there is a showing of probable cause to justify the night search.350
This heightened burden arises because a nighttime search is a greater
intrusion than a daytime search.351
The court has allowed nighttime searches in situations when evidence
can be quickly destroyed if the warrant is not promptly executed.352 The
burden requires an officer to allege facts beyond the evidence’s existence.353 The fact that drugs are easily disposed of or that a suspect holds
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Id. ¶ 11, 735 N.W.2d at 888.
Id. ¶ 7, 735 N.W.2d at 887.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10, 735 N.W.2d at 888.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 17, 735 N.W.2d at 890.
Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
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Id. ¶ 22, 735 N.W.2d at 891.
Id. ¶ 21, 735 N.W.2d at 890.
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odd hours are not sufficient to meet the burden of a nighttime warrant.354
Instead, the court has held that the necessity for a nighttime search exists
“where there is a reasonable possibility that the fruits, instrumentalities or
evidence of crime sought would not be expected to be at the searched
premises during the day or might be removed or dissipated if the search is
delayed.”355
To establish probable cause, Deputy Bitz told the magistrate specific
information received from a confidential source who had been at Roth’s
residence and provided information about how Roth manufactured methamphetamine.356 Upon this information, law enforcement conducted additional surveillance that connected Roth to Perry Anderson, a person
suspected of involvement in drug use and trafficking.357 This information
contained in the affidavit was sufficient probable cause to justify the nighttime warrant’s probable cause requirement.358 Additionally, the nighttime
search was necessary to allow law enforcement to catch Roth while in the
process of producing methamphetamine.359
The court concluded that because there was sufficient probable cause
for a nighttime search, Roth would not have prevailed had his counsel
raised the probable cause issue.360 Because he would not have prevailed
even if the issue had been raised, Roth did not suffer actual prejudice as
required for ineffective assistance of counsel actions.361
The court then examined whether the evidence would have been admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule if no probable
cause existed.362 The exclusionary rule applies to violations of Rule 41(c)
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.363 If the exclusionary
rule applies, the court must determine whether the good faith exception is
applicable.364
The good faith exception holds that suppression is an inappropriate
remedy for an illegal search if the law enforcement officer’s reliance upon
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Id. ¶ 22, 735 N.W.2d 891 (quoting State v. Richardson, 904 P.2d 886, 890 (Haw.
Id. ¶ 26, 735 N.W.2d at 892.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d at 892-93.
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Id. ¶ 29, 735 N.W.2d at 893.
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the search warrant was objectively reasonable.365 A good faith exception
inquiry asks whether a reasonably well-trained officer would know that the
search was illegal despite receiving authorization from a magistrate.366
There are four specific exceptions to the good faith exception; these
exceptions provide that reliance is not objectively reasonable:
(1) When the issuing magistrate was mislead by false information
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on
an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially
deficient warrant.367
The court held that the good faith exception applied because there was
no evidence that any of these exceptions applied.368 Nothing in the record
indicated that the issuing magistrate was misled or failed to act in a neutral
manner.369 The warrant was not facially deficient; Deputy Bitz presented
particular facts in the supporting affidavit gathered from both an informant
and surveillance.370 Ultimately, even if there was no probable cause,
Deputy Bitz’s reliance upon the issuing magistrate’s determination for a
night-time warrant was justified and the good faith exception would
apply.371
The court concluded that Roth would not have prevailed even if his
counsel had raised the issue of probable cause because the police had
enough proof to meet their probable cause burden.372 But, even if the police
did not meet the probable cause burden, the good faith exception would
have applied.373 Because Roth would have been unsuccessful even if the
issue had been raised, he did not suffer actual prejudice and therefore did
not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.374
Justice Maring dissented from the majority’s opinion and argued that
Roth suffered actual prejudice because there was not probable cause and the
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Id. (quoting State v. Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d 847, 850).
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good faith exception would not have applied.375 Justice Maring argued that
nighttime search warrants are allowed in situations in which evidence
would be disposed of by morning, by use, sale, or removal form the property.376 The affidavit did not put forth any facts that indicated that the
methamphetamine was being produced at night.377 Furthermore, no facts
were put forth that claimed that the methamphetamine would be destroyed,
removed or hidden by morning.378 Justice Maring rejected the majority’s
holding because the mere suspicion that one of the exigencies may happen
is not enough to justify a nighttime search warrant and does not meet the
requirement of probable cause.379
Justice Maring also rejected the majority’s view that the good faith
exception would apply.380 Justice Maring believed the warrant was facially
deficient because it lacked any facts which would support probable
cause.381 According to Justice Maring, Deputy Bitz knew that his affidavit
did not provide any facts proving that the evidence would be removed or
destroyed if the search waited until morning and therefore knew that the
probable cause required for a nighttime search was insufficient.382 For this
reason, Justice Maring argued that the good faith exception did not apply.383
Because the nighttime search warrant lacked probable cause and the good
faith exception did not apply, Justice Maring concluded that the court
should have reversed the order denying Roth’s motion for post-conviction
relief because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel.384
CRIMINAL LAW—PROCEDURE—USE OF RESTRAINTS ON
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
STATE V. KUNZE
In State v. Kunze,385 David Kunze appealed a district court judgment
convicting him of assaulting a correctional officer.386 Kunze argued that
the district court’s order to physically restrain him with handcuffs and a
waist belt during his jury trial, violated his constitutional right to a fair and
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impartial trial.387 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district
court’s order to restrain Kunze was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed
the district court’s decision.388
On August 12, 2005, Kunze was an inmate at the North Dakota State
Penitentiary in the administrative segregation unit.389 He was confined in a
single-person cell and at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day, his cell was
searched by four correctional officers.390 During the search, the officers
found and confiscated magazines, which belonged to another inmate, in
violation of penitentiary policy.391 As a result, Kunze was angry and upset
and a scuffle occurred, during which an officer suffered a hand injury that
drew blood.392
Prior to his trial, the State sought to have Kunze physically restrained
while the trial was in progress.393 The State argued that this request was
justified based on the nature of Kunze’s charged offense involving a violent
act against an officer; “Kunze’s history of assaults and escapes from custody”; Kunze’s substantial record of threats and assaults upon prison guards
and other individuals in the penitentiary; and, the highly restrained method
required to transport Kunze to and from the penitentiary due to his past
records of escapes and alleged assaultive behavior.394 When Kunze was
transported to and from the penitentiary, he was restrained through the use
of leg irons and a belly chain and moved by at least three officers, “two to
hold him and one to act as a ‘chase person.’”395 However, upon cross
examination, an officer acknowledged that Kunze was not violent the three
times he transported him and did not cause any problems while unshackled
to change clothing for trial.396
In response to the State’s claims, Kunze argued that the use of
restraints would imply to the jury that the trial was essentially a “foregone
conclusion.”397 Additionally, Kunze noted that it was in his best interests
not to be violent in the courtroom because it would lead to another charge
and assured his counsel that no problems would occur.398 Finally, Kunze
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spoke on his own behalf claiming that he had never attacked or threatened
anyone at the penitentiary.399
Without providing an explanation for its decision, the district court
granted the State’s request to restrain Kunze based on the evidence and the
parties’ arguments, but did not require leg restraints.400 Following this
decision, the jury trial began.401 The State presented evidence from the
officers involved in the incident, who claimed that following the confiscation of the magazines, Kunze became upset and yelled obscenities.402 Then,
Kunze aggressively approached an officer, who then pushed Kunze back
into the cell, “with his hands on Kunze’s shoulder and chest.”403 One
officer then testified that Kunze turned his head and grazed an officer’s
hand with his teeth, which broke the skin and drew blood, and kicked the
officer.404 The other officers supported this testimony.405
Following the State’s presentation of its case, Kunze presented evidence in his defense to contradict the officers’ testimony.406 He called an
inmate to the stand who had witnessed part of the incident and claimed that
Kunze did not have his false teeth in his mouth at the time that he allegedly
bit the officer.407 Additionally, the inmate claimed that the officers began
“roughing Kunze up” when he was handcuffed outside his cell.408 However, the inmate could not see in Kunze’s cell and thereby had no knowledge regarding whether Kunze bit or kicked an officer.409 Kunze also testified on his own behalf, claiming that he did not resist returning to his cell
and was shoved by an officer.410 Kunze claimed that the marks on the officer’s hand may have occurred when Kunze raised his cuffed hands to block
the officer’s hands and defend himself.411
Based on the evidence presented, Kunze was convicted by the jury of
assaulting a correctional officer.412 Upon appeal of this decision, Kunze
argued that district court violated his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial by requiring his physical restraint by handcuffs and a waist
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.

604

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:567

belt during his jury trial.413 The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the
case under an abuse of discretion standard of review.414
In reaching its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to its
recent decision in In re R.W.S.,415 and Deck v. Missouri,416 a recent United
States Supreme Court decision.417 R.W.S. involved a juvenile; however,
certain principles set forth in the case were applicable.418 In Deck, which
was relied upon in the R.W.S. decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that in general, the United States Constitution “prohibits the use of
visible shackles on a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case.”419 However, the use of shackles can be justified if an essential
state interest is present and specific to the particular defendant on trial, such
as security.420
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the use of physical
restraints on criminal defendants results in prejudice.421 This sight of a defendant in shackles can cause the jury to see the defendant as a dangerous,
guilty individual from the beginning of the trial, thereby undermining the
presumption of innocence in the factfinding process.422
Additionally, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of
restraints that are visible to a jury.423 However, this right is not absolute
and can be overcome by a trial court’s determination that the restraints are
justified by an essential state interest specific to a particular trial, such as
security or escape prevention.424 Therefore, before restraints may be used
on a defendant, a trial court must make a case-specific determination, which
takes into account the “special circumstances and particular concerns
related to the defendant on trial.”425 In R.W.S., the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted some factors that a trial court should take into account, namely
the defendant’s physical condition, temperament, and record; the desperateness of the defendant’s situation; the security of the courtroom and
413. Id. ¶ 13.
414. Id. ¶ 14.
415. 2007 ND 37, 728 N.W.2d 326.
416. 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
417. Kunze, ¶ 15, 738 N.W.2d at 476.
418. Id.
419. Id. (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 624).
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422. Id. at 476-77 (citing Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2002); Kennedy v.
Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 111 (6th Cir. 1973)).
423. Id. ¶ 17, 738 N.W.2d at 477 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 629).
424. Id. (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 628-29, 33; In re R.W.S., 2007 ND 37, ¶ 11, 728 N.W.2d
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425. Id. ¶ 18.
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courthouse; and the availability and adequacy of less prejudicial means of
security.426
In making its determination, an evidentiary hearing may take place to
resolve factual disputes, but is not required.427 If a trial court determines
that restraints are necessary, only those restraints that are necessary are
allowed to limit potential prejudice.428 The trial court should contemplate
whether less restrictive or prejudicial methods could be used.429 Furthermore, to provide for potential appellate review, the trial court must, at a
minimum, articulate its reasons for restraining the defendant on the
record.430
The district court held an evidentiary hearing immediately prior to
Kunze’s trial regarding the use of restraints and determined, based on the
evidence presented, that handcuffs and waist restraints were appropriate.431
The district court did not articulate its reasoning as to the appropriateness of
the restraints on the record.432 However, the justification for added security
measures was apparent on the record and the court tried to minimize
prejudice by requiring that the waist restraint be placed beneath Kunze’s
clothing.433
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that its decision in R.W.S. had
not been decided at the time of Kunze’s trial.434 Therefore, the district court
did not have this decision to use as guidance in its determination of the
appropriateness of the restraints.435 The court further acknowledged that in
the wake of R.W.S., district courts are required to make case-specific findings and explain, in more detail than present in this case, the rationale for
the decision to use restraints.436 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the record contained sufficient facts and reasoning to justify the
district court’s imposition of restraints, thereby affirming the district court’s
judgment.437

426. Id. (citing R.W.S., ¶ 16, 728 N.W.2d at 330-31).
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—DETERMINING THE
EXTENT OF FORCE REQUIRED
STATE V. VANTREECE
A jury found Alexander Vantreece guilty of gross sexual imposition
pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code and
a criminal judgment was entered against him, which he appealed.438 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that substantial evidence had not been
presented upon which the jury could reasonably find that “Vantreece compelled the complainant to submit to a sexual act by force.”439 Therefore, the
court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to enter the
judgment of acquittal.440
The incident upon which Vantreece was charged occurred at his exwife’s apartment during the morning of August 15, 2005.441 The complainant was the sister-in-law of Vantreece’s ex-wife and knew Vantreece.442
When the incident occurred, the complainant and her infant son were visiting Vantreece’s ex-wife.443 Vantreece’s ex-wife went to run errands and
took the complainant’s son with her, while the complainant remained at the
ex-wife’s apartment.444 After the ex-wife left, the complainant laid down in
a bedroom and was having trouble falling asleep when Vantreece entered
the room.445 Vantreece tried to put the complainant to sleep by laying down
next to her and rocking her, which he had done on prior occasions.446
Vantreece then left the room but returned a few minutes later.447 The
complainant pretended to be asleep as Vantreece laid down behind her
facing in the same direction.448
The complainant then alleged that Vantreece cut a hole in the pajama
pants she was wearing.449 The complainant did not say anything to
Vantreece and testified that Vantreece attempted to penetrate her vagina
with his penis but was unsuccessful.450 He then left the room; when he returned, he pulled her pants down further and again unsuccessfully attempted
438.
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to penetrate her again while she continued to pretend to sleep.451 Vantreece
left the room once again and when he returned a few seconds later, he successfully penetrated her vagina with his penis, which the complainant
testified felt lubricated.452 According to the complainant, Vantreece then
wiped her off with tissues, pulled her pants up and exited the room.453 The
complainant continued to feign sleep and waited approximately fifteen
minutes before leaving the room so Vantreece would not know that she was
awake.454 The complainant then went outside, where she was joined by
Vantreece.455 The two of them had a cigarette together and Vantreece told
her that his ex-wife wanted the complainant to take a shower before she
returned home.456 The complainant took a shower but only washed her hair
in order to preserve the evidence.457 The complainant then informed
Vantreece’s ex-wife about what had happened and his ex-wife drove the
complainant to the hospital where she was examined.458
The Fargo Police Department conducted an investigation and initially
charged Vantreece with gross sexual imposition pursuant to Section 12.120-03(1)(e) of the North Dakota Century Code.459 This class A felony
charge was based on the allegation that Vantreece engaged “in a sexual act
with a person who suffer[ed] from a mental disease or defect rendering her
incapable of understanding the nature of her conduct.” 460 However, this
charge was later amended to charge Vantreece pursuant to Section 12.1-2003(1)(a), which provided that he “engaged in a sexual act with another, or
caused another to engage in a sexual act, [by] compell[ing] the victim to
submit by force.”461 Following a jury trial, Vantreece was found guilty and
convicted of “‘class A’ felony gross sexual imposition.”462
On appeal, Vantreece argued that the gross sexual imposition charge
was not supported by sufficient evidence.463 Vantreece claimed that the
prosecutor overreached by repeatedly suggesting that the mental disease or
defect of the complainant was the key element at issue.464
451.
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The record contained evidence indicating that the defendant knew of
the complainant’s mental limitations.465 Vantreece told a Fargo Police
Department detective that he knew that the complainant was “a vulnerable
adult” with the “education of an eighth grader.”466 However, Vantreece
argued that the prosecutor’s argument as to the complainant’s mental abilities was both prejudicial and irrelevant.467 He founded this argument on the
fact that he was charged with engaging in a sex act by force, not engaging
in a sex act with a person suffering from a mental disease or defect.468
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that Vantreece
correctly noted that the prosecutor bore the burden of proving that the victim had been compelled to submit through force.469 However, the court
concluded that the prosecutor’s argument was not improper or prejudicial
because the record contained evidence pertaining to the “complainant’s
diminished mental capacity.”470 The court further noted that evidence of a
complainant’s mental capacity was relevant in determining the amount of
force necessary to compel the victim to engage in a sexual act.471
Vantreece next argued that there was insufficient evidence of force to
convict him of compelling the complainant by force to engage in a sexual
act pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century
Code.472 This section of the code provides that a person is guilty of an
offense if he or she “compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnap[p]ing, to be inflicted on
any human being.”473
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme court stressed that the State
was required to prove that Vantreece compelled the complainant to have
sex with him by exerting force upon her.474 If the State failed to establish
force, Vantreece would not be guilty of a crime under Section 12.1-2003(1)(a).475 The court further noted that mere evidence of the complainant’s acquiescence in the sexual act, based on her past acquiescence in
sexual advances, was not sufficient to meet this burden of proof.476
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In the present case, the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish
that Vantreece compelled the complainant to have sex with him by exerting
physical action or force over her.477 Although Vantreece ripped a hole in
the complainant’s pants, he left the room two times before finally having
sex with her.478 Under these circumstances, the mere evidence that
Vantreece ripped a hole in the complainant’s pants was not a sufficient
finding of force by which to compel the complainant to submit to engaging
in a sexual act.479
The North Dakota Supreme Court compared this case to Jiminez v.
State,480 a Texas Court of Appeals case, which reversed a sexual assault
conviction.481 Similar to the present case, the complainant in Jiminez
feigned sleep during an alleged sexual assault.482 The trial court in Jiminez
found the alleged attacker guilty, but the conviction was reversed by the
appellate court.483 On appeal, the court found an absence of threats or the
use of force or violence, because the attacker fled immediately upon hearing
the complainant cough and realizing that the complainant may be aware of
what was happening.484 Furthermore, as in the present case, no evidence
was presented as to the use of force or threats of force or violence on the
part of the alleged attacker.485
The court also looked to the Michigan Supreme Court case of People v.
Patterson,486 in which a sexual assault conviction was reversed based on
insufficient evidence of force or coercion.487 In Patterson, the defendant
touched the complainant without her consent while she was sleeping.488
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to expand the definition of force to
include this type of conduct because this type of conduct was already
provided for under a different section of the statute.489 The court explained
that the legislature’s intention in making the statute at issue in the case was
to distinguish between sexual assaults involving force or coercion and those
involving physically and mentally incapacitated victims.490
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Unlike Patterson, the complainant in the present case was not actually
asleep, she pretended to be asleep.491 Furthermore, the complainant admitted that Vantreece did not threaten her, force her down or restrain her to
prevent her from moving or fleeing.492 Instead, the sexual act was accomplished by Vantreece without compelling the complainant through the use
of force or threats.493 In this case, the prosecutor could have chosen to
charge Vantreece under either Section 12.1-20-07(1)(a) or 12.1-2003(1)(a)(c) of the North Dakota Century Code, neither of which requires a
finding of force.494 However, through its discretion, the prosecutor chose to
charge Vantreece under Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), which required that it be
proven that Vantreece compelled the complainant to submit to the sexual
act by force.495
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Vantreece may have
willfully taken advantage of the complainant, whom he knew to be vulnerable.496 However, the State failed to present substantial evidence upon
which it could be reasonably concluded that Vantreece compelled the complainant to submit to a sexual act by force or threat under Section 12.1-2003(1)(a).497 Therefore, the court reversed the criminal judgment against
Vantreece and remanded the case for the entry of the judgment of acquittal.498
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority’s decision.499 In his concurrence, Justice Crothers outlined North Dakota’s sexual offense statutory
scheme in Section 12.1-20 of the North Dakota Century Code.500 Within
this statutory scheme, Justice Crothers noted that the act of using force to
compel a victim to submit is perceived as more serious than many other
sexual offenses.501 Justice Crothers noted, in agreement with the majority,
that the mere ripping of the complainant’s pants was not sufficient evidence
of the use of force to compel the complainant to submit.502 Justice Crothers
further acknowledged that a decision in the alternate would essentially
nullify the legislature’s intent to increase the punishment for sexual
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offenses based on the level or type of violence accompanying the
offense.503
Justice Kapsner dissented with the majority’s decision and was joined
by Justice Maring in her conclusion that the force involved in the nonconsensual sexual penetration that occurred was sufficient under Section 12.120-03(1)(a).504 Justice Kapsner noted that “force” is defined by statute as
“physical action” and the State need only meet this definition, not prove
threat of death or other serious bodily injury.505
In her dissent, Justice Kapsner further indicated that the evidence was
sufficient to uphold the jury verdict.506 Justice Kapsner noted that a rational
factfinder could have concluded that Vantreece’s physical actions,
including ripping the complainant’s pants, forcing himself upon her without
consent and lubricating himself, met Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a)’s requirements.507 Justice Kapsner further argued that the cases relied upon by the
majority for their factual similarities are unpersuasive based on legal
dissimilarities.508 In Jiminez, the appellate court relied on the definition of
force as provided in case law, while the jury in the present case was
instructed to apply the statutory definition of force.509 Additionally, in
Patterson, Michigan’s statutory definition of force is quite dissimilar from
North Dakota’s statutory definition, so as to preclude any persuasive effect
of the case.510
Justice Kapsner indicated that the majority decision created a dangerous legal precedent by either requiring that it be proven that the victim
resisted the attacker or that the force used by the attacker was meant to
overcome the victim.511 Justice Kapsner argued that the force present in
this case, the penetration of a non-consenting victim, constituted sufficient
force.512 Justice Kapsner further noted that the determination of sufficiency
of the force was an issue for the jury to decide and that the charge of gross
sexual imposition is not based on the victim’s resistance, but is instead
based on the attacker’s conduct.513 Furthermore, requiring a victim to resist
an attacker could lead to death or serious bodily injury and an attacker’s
503.
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conduct should not be excused simply because the victim does not protect
herself as a reasonable person would have in the eyes of the court.514
Finally, Justice Kapsner stressed that the court’s use of the word
“acquiesce” implied that a woman who pretends to sleep during a sexual
assault will not be found to be victimized unless she does more.515 Justice
Kapsner argued that a sleeping woman should not be allowed to be victimized simply because she is acquiescing.516 Additionally, the determination
of whether or not a victim has in fact been victimized should remain within
the province of the jury as the fact-finders.517 In this case, the jury found
that the complainant did not acquiesce in engaging in the sexual act with
Vantreece; instead, she was compelled to do so.518 Therefore, Justice
Kapsner argued that there was sufficient evidence to support Vantreece’s
conviction for gross sexual imposition and would have affirmed the
judgment of the district court.519
CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF AN ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE
STATE V. FLATT
Lucas Flatt appealed a district court judgment and order denying his
motion to vacate a jury verdict for gross sexual imposition and dismiss the
charge.520 Flatt argued that a different version of the law should have been
applied by the district court.521 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Flatt had been appropriately charged based on the law that was
in effect when the crime took place, thereby affirming the district court’s
decision.522
On June 25, 2005, Flatt was charged under Section 12.1-20-03(3) of
the North Dakota Century Code with gross sexual imposition.523 The
charge stemmed from an incident that took place on December 27, 2004
whereby “Flatt engaged in a sexual act with a woman who was under
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fifteen years old.”524 In the Information, Flatt was charged under the law in
effect at the time the crime occurred.525
The gross sexual imposition law was subsequently amended on April
12, 2005 and became effective on August 1, 2005.526 The amended version
of Section 12.1-20-03(3) provided an increased offense gradation from “a
class A felony to a class AA felony if the actor was more than five years
older than the victim at the time of the crime.”527 Section 12.1-20-01(3)
was also amended by the North Dakota Legislature to provide that if an
act’s criminality depends on the age of the victim, the actor is only guilty of
an offense if the actor was more than four years older than the victim when
the crime occurred.528 This new provision thereby limited the conduct that
can be classified as criminal and the determination of the age of the actor in
relation to the victim were required to establish that a criminal act occurred
and determined the gradation of the offense.529 The information was not
amended to reflect these amendments.530
On January 13, 2006, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Flatt. 531
On March 28, 2006, Flatt filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.532 Flatt claimed that
through its amendments, the legislature changed the crime’s penalty and
added an additional element, specifically the relation between Flatt’s age
and the victim’s age.533 Flatt argued that the amended law should be
applied retroactively and that the State must prove and the jury must find
that Flatt was more than four years older than the victim to convict him of
the crime of gross sexual imposition.534 Because the jury did not find
Flatt’s age in relation to the victim’s, Flatt argued that the information had
to be dismissed.535 Further, the motion indicated that Flatt was “more than
four, but less than five years older than the victim.”536 The district court

524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. ¶ 3.
527. Id. The new version also provided a decreased offense gradation from “a class A felony
to a class C felony if the actor was more than four, but less than five years older than the victim at
the time of the crime.” Id.
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denied the motion on June 20, 2006 and entered its judgment on October
31, 2006, thereby sentencing Flatt to a class C felony.537
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Flatt argued that his
case must be dismissed based on the State’s failure to prove an essential
element of the offense to the jury, his age in relation to the victim’s age.538
Conversely, the State argued that the amendment’s age-in-relation-to-thevictim-provision is not an essential element of the offense; instead, it is
merely a mitigating factor.539
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the provision was an
essential element of the offense of gross sexual imposition, but was not an
element on the date that Flatt’s offense was committed because it was prior
to the amendment’s effective date.540 Pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(d)
of the North Dakota Century Code in effect prior to the 2005 amendments,
the State was required to allege and prove that: “(1) on or about the date
alleged in the information, in the county and state alleged in the information, the defendant willfully engaged in a sexual act with the victim, and (2)
the victim was less than fifteen years old.”541 Following the effective date
of the 2005 amendments, the age-in-relation-to-the-victim provision was
added to the general provisions of sex crimes, specifically Section 12.1-2001.542 Through the inclusion of this provision, the amendments essentially
added a new element to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(d), which a jury must find
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.543
Because the age-in-relation provision was construed as an essential
element of the crime, the court had to determine whether the amendments
applied in Flatt’s case.544 Therefore, the issue before the court was one of
both legislative intent and statutory construction.545 The court found that
Flatt’s claim failed because elements of an offense could not be retroactively applied without the legislature’s express approval.546

537. Id. The State conceded it was appropriate to sentence Flatt to a class C felony in light
of the 2005 legislative amendments. Id.
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543. Id. The North Dakota Legislature further amended the sex crimes chapter of the North
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Generally, statutory provisions are not retroactively applied without the
legislature’s express approval or declaration of such application.547 Retroactive application is disfavored because it places new legal responsibilities
on past conduct.548 However, in State v. Cummings,549 the North Dakota
Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule against retroactivity
when it is necessary to prevent an unjust result.550
In Flatt’s case, a lesser penalty of a class C felony was imposed on
Flatt in accordance with the Cummings exception.551 In the alternative,
Flatt argued that the exception required that an essential element be retroactively applied to his case.552 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed
with this argument by refusing to expand the narrow exception it created in
Cummings to “include the retroactive application of an additional element
of the offense” without an express declaration of the legislature’s intent to
do so.553 Instead, the court held that “a defendant is properly charged with
a crime when the charging document alleges each and every essential
element of the offense in effect on the date the crime occurred.”554
Finally, Flatt argued that he was entitled to relief through an arrest of
judgment or a dismissal of his case.555 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court did not reach this issue.556 The court concluded that the
Information properly charged Flatt with the correct elements of the offense
as of the date of the offense.557 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s decision and order denying Flatt’s motion to
dismiss.558
Justice Sandstrom specially concurred in the decision to address the
judicial branch’s claimed unconstitutional invasion of the legislative
branch.559 Justice Sandstrom noted that Section 1-02-10 of the North
Dakota Century Code requires an express declaration by the legislature to
547. Id. ¶ 9. Section 1-02-10 of the North Dakota Century Code specifically provides that
“[n]o part of this code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so.” N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-02-10 (2007). Cases of retroactive statutory application arise when a statute is applied to a
cause of action which arose prior to the statute’s effective date. Flatt, ¶ 9, 733 N.W.2d at 611.
548. Flatt, ¶ 9, 733 N.W.2d at 611.
549. 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986).
550. Flatt, ¶ 10, 733 N.W.2d at 611. See Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 471 (carving out an
exception to the general prohibition against retroactive statutory application).
551. Flatt, ¶ 11, 733 N.W.2d at 611-12.
552. Id. ¶ 12.
553. Id.
554. Id. (emphasis added).
555. Id. ¶ 13.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 612-13.
558. Id. ¶ 14, 733 N.W.2d at 613.
559. Id. ¶ 16.
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apply any part of the code retroactively.560 However, the majority referenced an exception to this general bar against retroactivity even though no
constitutional infirmity has been cited regarding Section 1-02-10.561 As a
result, the court does not have the authority to create an exception effectively amending Section 1-02-10; if the section is to be changed, it is the
function of the legislature to do so.562 For the court to act otherwise would
be a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers.563
CRIMINAL LAW—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION—DEFINING “INVOLVED” DISTRIBUTION
STATE V. DENNIS
In State v. Dennis,564 Douglas Dennis appealed a conditional plea of
guilty for “[the] possession of marijuana with intent to deliver within one
thousand feet of a school.”565 The Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that under the plain language of Section 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) of the North
Dakota Century Code, enhancement only exists for the offense of “manufacture and distribution of a controlled substance within one thousand feet
of a school.”566 The court reversed the district court’s judgment and
remanded the case for resentencing as a class B felony pursuant to Section
19-03.1-23(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code.567
Following a search of his residence, Dennis was arrested in February of
2006 for possession and intent to distribute marijuana within one thousand
feet of a school.568 Prior to the arrest, Detective Paul Olson applied for a
search warrant to search Dennis’ residence near Grimsrud Elementary
School.569 At the probable cause hearing, Detective Olson testified that
probable cause for the search warrant was based on tips and surveillance of
Dennis’ residence.570 Initially, Detective Olson received a tip that Dennis
was selling large amounts of marijuana from his residence.571 Detective
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Olson received an additional tip that a “‘shipment’ had arrived at Dennis’
home.”572 Officers also conducted surveillance of Dennis’ residence.573
Based upon the foregoing tips and surveillance, Detective Olson’s
search warrant application for Dennis’ residence was granted.574 Upon
searching Dennis’ residence, officers found less than one hundred grams of
marijuana consisting of eighteen individually wrapped bags, each of which
contained nearly thirty grams of the drug.575 Additionally, the officers
found “cash, money orders, smoking devices, a box of sandwich bags, an
envelope with ‘pay/owe information,’ and scales.”576
Dennis claimed that the offense as charged did not exist under North
Dakota law and moved that the charge be reduced.577 However, “the district court denied the motion.”578 Dennis accepted an oral conditional guilty
plea at the change of plea hearing, which reserved his right to appeal.579
Dennis was sentenced to a ten-year prison term following the State’s
sentencing recommendation, although all but six months of the term was
suspended for five years.580 Dennis was placed on house arrest for the sixmonth term and electronically monitored.581
On appeal, Dennis argued that the offense for which he was charged,
“possession of marijuana with intent to deliver within one thousand feet of
a school” does not exist under North Dakota law.582 Dennis claimed that
controlling language in the aggravating factor provision under Section 1903.1-23.1(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code for offenses committed
near schools is “manufacture” and “distribution.”583 Dennis argues that this
language requires “an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer,” not simply possession with the intent to deliver and that any statutory ambiguity be
resolved in his favor.584
The State, on the other hand, argued that the controlling language in the
statute is “involved.”585 The State applied the dictionary definition to this
term, which defines it in the present tense as including “as a necessary
572.
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circumstance, condition, or consequence.”586 In accordance with this definition, the State argued that the offense of possession with the intent to
deliver involved the distribution of a controlled substance.587 Furthermore,
the State contended that Dennis’ reasoning would produce an absurd result,
namely that the same penalty would be applied to his charge of possession
of personal consumption and his charge of possession with the intent to
deliver it to another person.588
The controversy in this case, as indicated by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, centered around the terms “involved,” “manufacture,” and “distribution.”589 The terms “manufacture” and “distribution” were defined by
statute, but the term “involved” was not.590 The court noted that “involved”
is defined in the dictionary as “‘implicated, affected, or committed.’”591
This definition differed from the State’s definition of the present tense of
“involved” and the State urged the court to adopt the broad interpretation of
the term “involved” used by the federal courts.592
In United States v. McKenney,593 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the term “involved” broadly.594 The Court determined that the
term “involved” extended the focus of the controlled substance law beyond
the precise offense at issue and encompassed other offenses which were
“related to or connected with such conduct.”595 However, the Court limited
this broad interpretation by requiring that for an offense to be included
under the “involving” language, the relationship between the offense “must
not be too remote or tangential.”596
Dennis argued that McKenney dealt with a very narrow issue regarding
only whether the inchoate offense of conspiracy involved possession with
the intent to distribute.597 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed by concluding that inchoate offenses such as conspiracy often encompass broader
conduct than choate offenses.598
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589. Id. ¶ 13, 733 N.W.2d at 245.
590. Id. at 245-46.
591. Id. ¶ 15, 733 N.W.2d at 246 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 742 (2d
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The North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately determined that the issue
before the court was “whether possession with intent to deliver involved the
manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.”599 First, the court
determined that Section 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) supported Dennis’ position that
the school zone aggravating factor did not apply to him because this factor
only applied if the offense actually “was the manufacture or distribution of
a controlled substance.”600 Second, the court found that Sections 19-03.123 and 19-03.1-23.1 lacked parallel language and concluded that the
inclusion of the terms “manufacture” and “distribution” impliedly excluded
the intent to deliver.601 Third, the court decided that the defendant had not
yet distributed a controlled substance so the mere possession of the substance did not “involve” its distribution; it only indicated an intent to do
so.602 The court further noted that if the legislature had intended the offense
of possession with the intent to deliver to be subjected to Section 19-03.123.1’s aggravating factors, it would have done so.603 Ultimately, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the State’s request to broadly apply the
term “involved” to Dennis’ charged offense was unreasonable.604 Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case
for “resentencing as a class B felony.”605
EVIDENCE—EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY—CHILD VICTIM OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT
STATE V. TIBOR
In State v. Tibor,606 Art Tibor appealed a district court judgment
finding him “guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition.”607 Tibor argued that the district court’s decision to allow expert witness testimony,
allow an expert witness to “vouch for the victim’s credibility,” and allow
testimony that was cumulative and hearsay was an abuse of discretion.608
Additionally, Tibor argued that his conviction was not supported by
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Id. ¶ 19, 733 N.W.2d at 248 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
2007 ND 146, 738 N.W.2d 492.
Tibor, ¶ 1, 738 N.W.2d at 494.
Id.
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sufficient evidence.609 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with
Tibor’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s decision.610
On December 9, 2005, a school counselor met with Jane Doe, who was
eleven years old.611 Doe had given the counselor a note stating that she
needed to talk to someone about something that had been happening since
she was in kindergarten.612 During the meeting, Doe revealed to the counselor that every day after school when her mother was gone, her stepfather,
Tibor, touched her breasts and vagina.613 Following the meeting, the counselor reported the allegations to social services and Doe was interviewed
that same day.614 In the interview, Doe stated that Tibor touched her breasts
and vagina with his hands and that these incidents took place “after school
in her bedroom, the laundry room, Tibor’s bedroom, and the basement
living room, when her mother was at work.”615
On December 13, 2005, Doe underwent a sexual assault exam, during
which she stated that Tibor touched her vagina with his fingers several
times a month and even more than once a week at times.616 She also stated
that after Tibor touched her, it would sometimes hurt when she would
urinate.617 The doctor performing the exam found an approximately four
millimeter long tear on Doe’s vagina, which was consistent with the
allegations.618
Based on these allegations, Tibor was charged with one count of gross
sexual imposition.619 Later, the charge was increased to five counts of
gross sexual imposition for the alleged abuse of Doe from August 1, 2005
through December 10, 2005.620 The charges were brought under Sections
12.1-20-03(2)(a) and 12.1-20-03(1)(d) of the North Dakota Century
Code.621
Prior to trial, the State announced that it planned to call Paula Condol
as an expert witness to testify as to the “typical behaviors of sexually
abused children.”622 The State also announced that it intended to call Dr.
609.
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Alonna Norberg as an expert witness to testify whether Doe’s genital abrasion was consistent with her allegations.623 Additionally, the State intended
to present hearsay testimony, comprised of out-of-court statements made by
Doe.624
Tibor brought a motion in limine to exclude Condol’s testimony because it would confuse the jury and be prejudicial.625 Tibor also objected to
the State’s use of hearsay testimony.626 The district court denied the motion
in limine finding that the testimony could aid the jury in “understanding the
evidence or determining the facts in issue.”627 A hearing was held as to the
admissibility of the hearsay testimony.628 The court found the statements
admissible because the requirements of Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence, regarding statements made by children as to sexual
abuse, had been met.629
A jury trial was then held from July 31, 2006 to August 2, 2006.630 At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Tibor guilty on two of the five
counts and acquitted him of the remaining three counts.631 Tibor was convicted of Count 4, which alleged that “Tibor inserted his tongue into Doe’s
vulva,” and Count 5, which alleged that “Tibor touched Doe’s vagina with
his finger.”632 Ultimately, “Tibor was sentenced to twelve years in
prison.”633
On appeal, Tibor argued that the district court abused its discretion in
allowing Condol’s testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome.634 The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that it had
never decided whether a district court’s allowance of testimony of child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome amounted to an abuse of discretion.635 Other courts have addressed the issue, however, and determined
that expert witnesses may testify as to “typical behaviors or characteristics
of sexually abused children and whether a specific victim exhibits symptoms consistent with sexual abuse.”636 However, courts must be careful to
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prevent an expert from vouching for a “child victim’s credibility” when
allowing this type of expert testimony.637
Based on the reasoning of these other courts, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that a district court does not abuse its discretion
when it allows testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome as long as the testimony could help a jury understand the evidence.638 The court reasoned that the district court’s decision to allow
Condol’s testimony in this case was appropriate because Condol was qualified as an expert and the testimony could assist the jury’s understanding of
the evidence.639 The court further found that the district court did not reach
its decision in an “arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.”640
Therefore, the court held that the district court’s decision did not constitute
an abuse of discretion.641
Tibor next argued, however, that in Condol’s testimony, she “vouched
for Doe’s credibility and testified she believed Doe had been abused.”642 In
the State’s disclosure of the witness, the State stated that it intended to use
Condol’s testimony to analyze whether Doe’s behaviors were typical of
children that had been sexually abused.643 Furthermore, the State indicated
that it did not plan to ask Condol if she believed Doe had been sexually
abused.644 Tibor argued that the State exceeded the scope of its disclosure
when it allowed Condol to testify that she believed Doe had been abused
because it invaded the province of the jury.645 The North Dakota Supreme
Court found, however, that although Condol’s testimony supported a
determination that Doe had been abused, the possibility that Doe had not
been truthful in her testimony continued to remain.646 Therefore, the court
determined that Condol’s testimony was appropriate and did not invade the
jury’s province.647
Tibor further argued that it was inconsistent to allow the State to
present expert testimony to analyze whether Doe’s behavior was consistent
with the typical behavior of sexually abused children.648 Pursuant to State
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v. Austin,649 Tibor, as a criminal defendant, was not allowed to present
expert testimony regarding his alleged sexual interest in young girls.650 In
Austin, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s decision
to exclude a criminal defendant’s use of expert testimony as to whether he
was sexually interested in children.651 The court determined that the district
court’s explanation as to the exclusion of the evidence was not arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable; therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion.652 In this case, the court also held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion.653
Tibor next argued that the district court’s decision to allow expert
witnesses to testify about Doe’s change in demeanor during her interview
with a social worker was an abuse of discretion because the testimony constituted hearsay and the State failed to disclose it in the pretrial notice.654
Additionally, Tibor claimed that this testimony was cumulative and
prevented him from effectively cross-examining Doe because it was too
prejudicial.655
The North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that Doe’s nonverbal
conduct had been offered as evidence of her demeanor and attitude.656 The
court looked to Rule 801 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, which
provided that nonverbal conduct could be offered as evidence without constituting hearsay if it was not intended as an assertion.657 Therefore, the
court found that the testimony regarding Doe’s demeanor was not hearsay
and the district court’s decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of
discretion.658 As to Tibor’s argument that the testimony was “cumulative
and unfairly prejudicial,” the court determined that while the testimony was
repetitious, this mere repetition did not make the statements unduly prejudicial.659 Therefore, the court found that the district court’s decision to
admit the evidence of Doe’s demeanor did not amount to an abuse of
discretion.660

649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

2007 ND 30, 727 N.W.2d 790.
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Tibor’s final argument on appeal asserted that the evidence in the
record was not sufficient to sustain his conviction of two counts of gross
sexual imposition.661 Tibor argued that he was innocent based on Doe’s
inconsistent statements regarding the abuse.662 Additionally, Tibor contended that he was not responsible for Doe’s genital abrasion because Doe’s
physical examination took place five days after the last alleged episode of
abuse and the doctor testified that the “abrasion was probably more than 2448 hours old and would heal quickly.”663 Tiber further claimed that he
“proved he did not have time to abuse Doe.”664
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that enough evidence had been
presented so that Tibor was not convicted on all five counts of gross sexual
imposition for which he had been charged.665 However, the court noted that
sufficient evidence had been presented to charge him with two of those
counts.666 Tibor was charged with “inserting his tongue into Doe’s vulva
and for using his finger to touch Doe’s vagina.”667 Evidence was presented
through Doe’s testimony that Tibor had touched her in these ways and that
the abuse occurred when her mother was not home.668 Evidence was also
presented that Doe and her siblings were home alone with Tibor at times
and Doe’s brothers testified that during these times, Doe was sometimes
alone in a room with Tibor and the door was locked or closed.669 The
doctor that performed the sexual assault exam on Doe also testified that
Doe’s genital abrasion was consistent with the sexual abuse allegations.670
Furthermore, expert testimony was presented that Doe’s behavior was
consistent with the behavior typically exhibited by children that had been
sexually abused.671
Based on the evidence in the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that sufficient evidence was present to sustain Tibor’s convictions for gross sexual imposition.672 The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment.673
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD SUPPORT—COMPUTATION OF SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS
CLINE V. CLINE
In Cline v. Cline,674 the Minot Regional Child Support Enforcement
Unit (Unit) appealed the district court’s “July 28, 2006 Second Amended
Judgment,” which set David Cline’s child support.675 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the district court’s failure to compute David
Cline’s child support obligation according to the child support guidelines
was an error.676 The court therefore reversed and remanded the case for a
redetermination of the child support obligation under the guidelines.677
In 1997, David and Sharon Cline divorced and Sharon received
custody of their two minor children.678 David was ordered to pay child
support in an amount calculated by the court through the use of the child
support guidelines.679 The court then adjusted David’s support obligation
based on his “extended visitation with the children and his travel costs,”
thereby giving him a “two-month credit against his annual support
obligation.”680
In 2002, Sharon requested and was granted permission to move to Iowa
with the children.681 At that time, David’s monthly obligation was increased to $602 based on an increased income and he continued to receive
the annual credit.682 An amended judgment incorporated these provisions
into the parties’ stipulation.683
In 2006, Sharon requested that the Unit review David’s child support
obligation.684 The Unit motioned that David’s obligation be increased
based on changes in his income.685 The Unit and David stipulated that his
monthly net income was $3,234, which would amount to a monthly support
obligation of $920 without accounting for any deviations.686 The Unit
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claimed that deviations from the guidelines must be calculated under
relevant provisions of the guidelines.687 David, however, argued that he
should be allowed to receive the credit provided in the prior stipulation.688
The district court determined that David “should continue to receive a
two-month credit against his support obligation.”689 In arriving at this decision, the district court noted that the credit had been determined based on
the increased expenses David would have incurred when Sharon moved to
Iowa.690 Therefore, the district court continued the two-month credit of
David’s child support obligation and recalculated the obligation.691
The Unit appealed the district court’s decision.692 The Unit argued that
the district court’s failure to comply with the child support guidelines
pursuant to chapter 75-02-04.1 of the North Dakota Administrative Code in
calculating David’s obligation was an error.693 In child support determinations, “[a] court errs as a matter of law when it fails to comply with the
requirements of the child support guidelines in determining an obligor’s
child support obligation.”694
In this case, the court acknowledged the district court’s power to
modify earlier child support orders.695 However, the court noted that courts
cannot order a reduced support obligation that fails to comply with the child
support guidelines.696 Therefore, the court found that the district court had
erred as a matter of law when it failed to compute David’s support obligation according to the child support guidelines.697
Under the child support guidelines, specific provisions exist regarding
“deviations for extended visitation and travel expenses related to [the] exercise of visitation.”698 Specifically, Section 75-02-04.1-08.1 of the North
Dakota Administrative Code provides that a district court is required to
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. ¶ 5.
690. Id.
691. Id.
692. Id. ¶ 6.
693. Id.
694. Id. (citing Heinz v. Heinz, 2001 ND 147, ¶ 16, 632 N.W.2d 443, 450). As to the standard of review in child support determinations, the de novo standard applies to questions of law
and the clearly erroneous standard applies to findings of fact. Id. (citing Berge v. Berge, 2006 ND
46, ¶ 7, 710 N.W.2d 417, 419). Additionally, in some limited areas, findings of fact may be
“matters of discretion subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Id. (Berge, ¶ 7, 710
N.W.2d at 419).
695. Id. ¶ 8, 732 N.W.2d at 388 (citing Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶ 10, 574 N.W.2d
855, 858).
696. Id. (citing Zarrett, ¶¶ 6-8, 574 N.W.2d at 857).
697. Id.
698. Id. ¶ 9.
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adjust a child support obligation upon an award of extended visitation to an
obligor.699 Furthermore, subsection (2) of this provision contains a complex formula to use to calculate deviations from child support based on the
length of visitation in the court order.700
When extended visitation is present, “the district court must adjust the
amount of child support to reflect that visitation in accordance with the
guideline formula.”701 In this case, David’s visitation undisputedly satisfied
the guideline’s definition of extended visitation.702 Therefore, David’s
child support obligation must be adjusted in accordance with Section 75-0204.1-08.1 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.703
The child support guidelines also specifically provide for deviations
from support obligations when obligors have “a reduced ability to pay due
to travel expenses incurred for child visitation” in Section 75-02-04.109(2)(i).704 The guidelines provide that in these situations, the travel expenses are to be “subtracted from the obligor’s net income before calculating the support obligation.”705 In this case, the district court awarded
David a two-month credit towards his annual support obligation instead of
using the child support guidelines to determine the appropriate adjustment
amount.706 Ultimately, the court must follow the provisions in the child
support guidelines as to David’s “scheduled extended visitation and related
travel expenses.”707
On appeal, David argued that the district court’s judgment should be
upheld.708 He claimed that the child support award was “at least 85 percent
of the calculated amount under the guidelines” and cited Section 14-0908.4(3) of the North Dakota Century Code in support of this argument.709
The court however indicated that this statute did not expressly or implicitly
allow “child support awards that deviate less than 15 percent from the
calculated support obligation under the guidelines.”710 Instead, it merely
establishes a line below which child support agencies are required to “seek
699. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-08.1 (2008)).
700. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-08.1(2)).
701. Id. (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 2002 ND 114, ¶ 19, 646 N.W.2d 693, 698; Gleich v. Gleich,
2001 ND 185, ¶ 14, 636 N.W.2d 418, 423).
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id. ¶ 10.
705. Id.; see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-09(7) (stating that adjustments “shall be
made to the obligor’s net income”).
706. Id. ¶ 11, 732 N.W.2d at 388-89.
707. Id. at 389.
708. Id. ¶ 12.
709. Id.
710. Id.
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an amendment of court-ordered support.”711 Furthermore, this section
specifically requires that support awards be calculated in accordance with
the child support guidelines.712
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district
court’s computation of David’s child support obligation was an error as a
matter of law.713 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to
redetermine David’s child support obligation under the child support guidelines.714
PROBATE LAW AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION—NOTICE TO
CREDITORS—REASONABLE DILIGENCE STANDARD
ESTATE OF GILBERT ELKEN, JR .
Lorry Larson appealed a district court judgment which denied his
claims against the decedent’s estate.715 The North Dakota Supreme Court
found that the district court misapplied the law when it determined that
Larson was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor pursuant to Section 30.119-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, thereby finding Larson’s claims
untimely.716 The court ultimately held that Larson was a reasonably
ascertainable creditor and remanded the case for further proceedings on
Larson’s claims.717
The decedent was granted a life estate in a house in Mayville, North
Dakota in February 1999.718 The decedent lived in the house until July
2002, upon which time he moved into a nursing home in Mayville where he
remained until his death on February 16, 2005.719 A guardian served on the
decedent’s behalf during this time.720
After a pipe broke in the decedent’s house in 2004 and caused water
damage, Larson made the repairs.721 Larson then submitted a bill to the
decedent’s guardian and indicated that all of the necessary repairs had not

711. Id.
712. Id. ¶ 13.
713. Id. ¶ 14.
714. Id.
715. Estate of Gilbert Elken, Jr., 2007 ND 107, ¶ 1, 735 N.W.2d 843, 843.
716. Id.
717. Id.
718. Id. ¶ 2. Lorry Larson, Joan Tryhus, and Sandra Bloomquist were granted remainders in
the life estate. Id.
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Id.
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been made.722 Larson acknowledged that the decedent’s guardian had
always indicated a willingness to pay for any additional damages.723
Following the decedent’s death, the personal representative of his
estate published “a notice to creditors in the Traill County Tribune for three
successive weeks in April 2005.”724 This notice provided that any creditor’s claim, which was not presented to the personal representative of the
decedent’s estate within three months of publication, would be barred.725 A
copy of the notice was not mailed to Larson, who was a California resident.726 Over a year later, Larson sought compensation for repairs made to
the decedent’s house and “filed claims against the decedent’s estate on May
12, May 23, June 26, and June 30, 2006” which were denied by the
personal representative.727
Larson petitioned the district court to allow his claims.728 The parties
then presented affidavits and agreed to have the court decide the case based
on the record.729 The district court denied the claims “concluding they were
not submitted to the personal representative within three months after the
publication of the notice to creditors” pursuant to North Dakota Century
Code Section 30.1-19-03(1).730 The district court determined that Larson
was not “a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor” under Section 30.119-01.731 In making its decision, the court looked to the legislature’s intent
under Section 30.1-19-01 and defined “a reasonably ascertainable creditor”
as a “creditor who regularly submits billings.”732 The court determined that
Larson’s claims did not fit into this narrow definition and ultimately denied
the claims.733
Upon appeal, Larson argued that the district court erred in finding his
claims against the decedent’s estate untimely.734 Section 30.1-19-03(1) of
722. Id.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. Id. at 844.
728. Id. ¶ 3.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id. The district court further found that “the personal representative was not required to
mail Larson a copy of the notice to creditors.” Id. Additionally, the court “declined to adopt a
‘good cause’ exception for filing claims and found there was no evidence of fraud or affirmative
deception to support Larson’s equitable estoppel argument.” Id.
734. Id. ¶ 5, 735 N.W.2d at 845. Since the district court action was treated as a bench trial
and tried without a jury, the court’s findings of fact are governed under a clearly erroneous
standard of review. Id. ¶ 4, 735 N.W.2d at 844.
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the North Dakota Century Code provides that creditor claims against a
decedent’s estate, which arise prior to the decedent’s death, are barred
unless the presentment of the claims occurs within three months of the first
publication and mailing of notice under Section 30.1-19-01; or, if notice to
creditors is not published or mailed, presentment of the claims occurs
within three years of the date of the decedent’s death.735
Larson argued that the district court erred in its decision that Larson
was not entitled to actual notice by erroneously limiting the definition of a
reasonably ascertainable creditor as a person who regularly submits billing
statements.736 Larson further argued that the court erred in its interpretation
of the term “includes” as a term of limitation.737 Finally, Larson argued that
this interpretation ignored the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,738 which imposed a
due process requirement on personal representatives to make “reasonably
diligent efforts to uncover the identities of creditors.”739
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its decision by addressing the
use of the term “includes.”740 The court noted that when used in a statutory
definition, the term “includes” has consistently been interpreted as a word
of enlargement, not a term of limitation.741 Specifically, the court acknowledged that the use of the term “includes” in defining a reasonably ascertainable creditor as one who regularly submits billing, is “a definition of enlargement and not of limitation.”742
The mailed notice requirement for reasonably ascertainable creditors
provided for in Section 30.1-19-01 of the North Dakota Century Code was
enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Pope.743 In Pope, the Supreme Court held that a notice provision for claims
in probate requiring only notice by publication, did not satisfy the due
process requirement that reasonably ascertainable creditors must receive
actual notice.744 The Court determined that a personal representative satisfies this due process requirement by using “reasonably diligent efforts” to
establish the identities of reasonably ascertainable creditors.745 However,
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
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Id. ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d at 846.
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for creditors that are not reasonably ascertainable, notice by publication is
sufficient.746 Based on this decision and rules of statutory construction, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that under Section 30.1-19-01, a reasonably ascertainable creditor can be uncovered by a personal representative
through reasonably diligent efforts.747
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court’s
interpretation of a reasonably ascertainable creditor under Section 30.1-1901, was contrary to the decision in Pope and the principle that the term “includes” is a term of enlargement and not of limitation when used in a definition.748 The district court determined that Larson was not entitled to the
mailed notice given to creditors because he was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor in that he did not regularly submit billings to the decedent or
the decedent’s estate.749 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this
determination was based on an erroneous and limiting interpretation of
Section 30.1-19-01 and concluded that the district court misapplied the law
in its interpretation of a reasonably ascertainable creditor.750
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the parties’
arguments regarding whether the personal representative could have discovered Larson’s claims by contacting the decedent’s guardian and inquiring into the decedent’s financial affairs.751 These arguments raised the
question as to whether the determination of a reasonably ascertainable
creditor involves an inquiry into the facts of the case.752 This inquiry turns
upon what constitutes reasonable due diligence on the part of the personal
representative.753
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Section 30.1-18-15(27)
imposes a duty on personal representatives to “satisfy and settle any claims
against an estate.”754 Additionally, Section 30.1-28-12 provides guardians
with the authority to deal with their ward’s property.755 According to the
court, these provisions require a personal representative to inquire as to the
state of a decedent’s financial affairs, such as by contacting a known

746. Id. The Court reasoned that it was reasonable to dispense with the actual notice requirement for those creditors with merely conjectural claims. Id.
747. Id.
748. Id. ¶ 10, 735 N.W.2d at 847.
749. Id.
750. Id.
751. Id. ¶ 11.
752. Id. ¶ 12.
753. See id. ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d at 847-48 (explaining that a personal representative has the
duty to satisfy claims against an estate and to use reasonably diligent efforts in this process).
754. Id. at 847.
755. Id.
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guardian as to the decedent’s financial affairs.756 Therefore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Larson was a reasonably ascertainable potential creditor who could have been found through reasonably diligent efforts, specifically if the personal representative had contacted the
decedent’s guardian.757 As a result, the court found that Larson’s claims
were not time barred and remanded the case for further proceedings on the
claims.758
TORT LAW—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—SHOWING GOOD
CAUSE
SCHEER V. ALTRU HEALTH SYSTEM
Loretta Scheer appealed a district court judgment, which dismissed her
claim of professional negligence.759 The district court dismissed the claim
for failing to serve an expert affidavit within the three month statute of
limitations.760 An exception to dismissal for failing to meet this statute of
limitations is provided in Section 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century
Code, but this exception is only appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates
good cause.761 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff may
move for good cause as late as in response to [a] defendant’s motion to
dismiss.”762 Based on this holding, the court reversed and remanded the
district court’s decision to decide whether Scheer demonstrated good cause
to support an extension.763
In February 2004, Scheer sought treatment for abdominal pain at Altru
Health System.764 Dr. Leslie Sullivan performed surgery on Scheer’s
gallbladder on March 4, 2004 at the Altru facility.765 Scheer was discharged from Altru on March 5, 2004.766 That evening, however, Scheer
experienced “‘crampy abdominal pain’ and ‘felt something pull.’”767 On
March 8, 2004, Scheer told Dr. Sullivan about these symptoms.768 On
March 10, 2004, Dr. Sullivan performed another surgery on the area and
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“placed a drain in Scheer’s bile duct.”769 Scheer experienced further problems and was transferred to a Fargo hospital, then to the Mayo Clinic on
March 12, 2004.770 While at the Mayo Clinic, doctors told Scheer that “part
of her bile duct had been surgically removed.”771
On March 9, 2006, Scheer filed a complaint in district court, which
claimed that Sullivan negligently performed Scheer’s gallbladder operation.772 The court also found, for purposes of the appeal, that Altru Health
System was served on March 9, 2006 and Dr. Sullivan was served on
March 13, 2006.773 On July 12, 2006, both Dr. Sullivan and Altru Health
System moved to dismiss the claim because Scheer allegedly failed under
Section 28-01-46, “to serve them with an admissible expert affidavit.”774
The parties filed the motion with the district court on July 17, 2006 and
Scheer requested additional time to respond to the parties’ motion to
dismiss.775 That same day, Scheer sent a letter to Dr. Sullivan and Altru.776
The letter was written by Dr. Jeffry Snow on March 1, 2006 and contained
his opinion that the operation performed by Dr. Sullivan fell below the
appropriate standard of care.777 On July 24, 2006, Scheer’s request for
additional time to respond to the motion to dismiss was granted by the
district court.778
On August 15, 2006, Scheer responded to the motion and on August
25, 2006, Scheer served Altru and Dr. Sullivan with an affidavit from Dr.
Snow.779 In his affidavit, Dr. Snow opined that Dr. Sullivan performed
Scheer’s operation below the standard of care.780 Specifically, Dr. Snow
stated that Dr. Sullivan mistakenly cut and clipped the common bile duct
instead of the cystic duct.781
The district court dismissed Scheer’s lawsuit on October 17, 2006
without prejudice because Scheer “failed to timely serve the expert affidavit.”782 The court based this decision on the Eighth Circuit Court of
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Appeals decision of Weasel v. St. Alexius Medical Center,783 which interpreted the 1997 version of Section 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century
Code.784 In this decision, the Eighth Circuit held that a motion for good
cause by a plaintiff can only be granted if the motion is filed “prior to [a]
[d]efendant filing a [m]otion to [d]ismiss for failure to obtain an expert
opinion within three months.”785 The district court concluded under this
holding that Scheer’s request for an extension was too late and dismissed
her claim without prejudice.786
On appeal, Scheer argued that the district court’s dismissal of her claim
without prejudice could be appealed because if she were to find that the
three month period lapsed, she would not be able to relitigate her claim.787
The 2005 version of Section 28-01-46 provides in part:
Any action for injury or death alleging professional negligence by
a physician, . . . hospital, . . . must be dismissed without prejudice
on motion unless the plaintiff serves upon the defendant an
affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion to support a
prima facie case of professional negligence within three months of
the commencement of the action. The court may set a later date for
serving the affidavit for good cause shown by the plaintiff.788
Scheer argued that the district court erred in interpreting Section 28-0146 because the statute does not state that a plaintiff must show good cause
before the expiration of the three month period or ask for an extension prior
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.789 Additionally, Scheer claimed that
the decision should be remanded to consider whether she had good cause
for an extension.790
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its decision by analyzing
Section 28-01-46. The court first stated that Section 28-01-46 creates an
affirmative defense and contains two exceptions.791 First, the time within
which the plaintiff must serve the expert affidavit can be extended upon a
showing of good cause by the plaintiff.792 Second, if the injury at issue is
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an obvious occurrence, an expert affidavit is not required.793 The second
exception was not at issue because Scheer did not contend that her injury
amounted to an obvious occurrence.794
Pursuant to Section 28-01-46, if good cause is shown, a court may
choose to grant or deny a plaintiff’s request for an extension to serve his or
her expert affidavit before the three month period expires.795 Once the three
month period expires, however, the case becomes “eligible for dismissal
without prejudice.”796 However, the statute does not indicate when or how
a plaintiff is able to avoid dismissal by showing good cause for an extension
to serve the expert affidavit.797 Instead, a plaintiff is not able to show good
cause once the case is dismissed because the case is no longer pending upon
dismissal.798 Furthermore, this section is only intended to apply before
trial, not during trial and does not require a defendant to move to dismiss
immediately upon the lapse of the three month period.799
Section 28-01-46 places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate good cause.800 Scheduling conferences may provide an opportunity
for plaintiffs to motion for good cause for an extension.801 Additionally,
since the section serves as an affirmative defense for defendants, defendants
may choose not to assert the defense and reach an agreement with the
plaintiff to set a different deadline for service of the expert affidavit.802
However, agreement between the parties is not necessary if sufficient good
cause is presented by the plaintiff.803 If an agreement is reached between
the parties, the scheduling order must clearly reflect such agreement and
specify the new deadline for service of the expert affidavit.804
Furthermore, the exception requires that the plaintiff demonstrate good
cause prior to the dismissal of the case.805 It is possible that a defendant can
file a motion to dismiss long after the three month period lapses.806
Additionally, plaintiffs have the right to respond to the defendant’s motion

793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
Id. ¶ 25 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2001)).
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id.

636

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:567

to dismiss.807 Therefore, “the latest a plaintiff could show good cause
would be in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”808
In applying the statute to the facts in this case, the North Dakota
Supreme Court applied the plain meaning of the statute.809 In this case,
Scheer’s complaint was served on Altru Health System on March 9, 2006
and on Dr. Sullivan on March 13, 2006.810 The district court found that the
latest date upon which Scheer’s three month period would lapse would be
on June 13, 2006.811 Over a month after the statutory period lapsed on July
17, 2006, Dr. Sullivan and Altru asserted their affirmative defense and filed
a motion to dismiss Scheer’s claim.812 The district court granted Scheer an
extension to respond to the motion and Scheer served the expert affidavit on
August 25, 2006.813
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the
district court misapplied the Eighth Circuit’s Court of Appeals interpretation of Section 28-01-46 in Weasel.814 As a result, the district court dismissed Scheer’s claim without determining the existence of good cause.815 The
North Dakota Supreme Court stressed that whether Scheer demonstrated
good cause for an extension in her response was a question to be decided by
the trier of fact.816 As a result, the district court’s decision was reversed and
remanded for a determination of good cause.817
Justice Kapsner concurred in the result but did not furnish a separate
opinion.818 Justice Crothers’ dissented with the majority’s opinion.819 In
Justice Crothers’ opinion, the majority did not follow the legislative mandates requiring that statutes be interpreted according to their plain meaning
or the mandate in the controlling statute in this case, Section 28-01-46.820
Justice Crothers provided that Section 28-01-46 is clear in its mandate
that a plaintiff’s claim be dismissed if the affidavit is not “served within
three months of commencement of the action.”821 Justice Crothers asserted
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that in this case an affidavit was required and Scheer both failed to meet the
three-month deadline and failed to request an extension before the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.822 Therefore, in Justice Crothers’ opinion,
Scheer’s claim was properly dismissed under Section 28-01-46.823
Justice Crothers asserted that the majority focused its opinion on the
fact that the defendants did not immediately move to dismiss the claim
following the three month lapse.824 Instead, Justice Crothers argued that in
this case, the defendants’ failure to immediately motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claim provided Scheer with additional time to serve the expert
affidavit.825
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